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DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS




Reputation is said to be at the heart of one's dignity;' free expression, at
the heart of a true democracy.2 One clash between these two interests, repu-
tation and free expression, spawned the modem era of defamation3 law just
1. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("The
right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from unjustified invasion and wrongful
hurt reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being-a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty."). One commentator
described the context for considering defamation law in the following terms:
Within the complex group of individual interests of personality is the claim to
honor and reputation which Anglo-American law seeks to protect, in the main, by a
civil action for libel or slander. There is no need to quote Shakespeare to emphasize
the inestimable value of a good name. Consequently, no system of law can fail to
take some account of this interest and afford some redress for harm suffered from
disparaging or defamatory statements.
Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 Wis. L. REV. 99, 99.
2. See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government"); Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Our notions of liberty re-
quire a free and vigorous press that presents what it believes to be information of interest or
importance.").
3. Defamation has been defined as a representation that tends to "[e]xpose one to public
hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely, odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degrada-
tion, or disgrace, or to induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and
to deprive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society." Kimmerle v. New York
Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 100, 186 N.E. 217, 218 (1933). However, this characterization
also has been called too narrow, as it excludes such communications as imputation of poverty
or insanity, or the assertion that a woman has been raped, which have also been adjudged to be
defamatory. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 11, at 773 (5th ed. 1984) (citations omit-
ted). "Defamation is rather that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular sense; to
diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is held, or to excite
adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against him. It necessarily, however,
involves the idea of disgrace .... " Id. Defamation law is actually an umbrella term for the
related torts of libel and slander. The most basic distinction between these two historically has
been that slander pertained to the spoken word, while libel encompassed that which was
printed. Libel has expanded, however, to include pictures, signs, statues, and motion pictures.
Id. § 112, at 786. See generally Comment, Liability and Damages in Libel and Slander Law,
47 TENN. L. REV. 814 (1980). For purposes of this Note, defamation will be used to denote
libel.
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more than two decades ago in New York Times v. Sullivan.4 Since that time
defamation law has developed haltingly, with each side trading victories and
defeats.5 No matter who appears to win any one jurisprudential round, how-
ever, the proliferation,6 complexity,7 and sheer expense' of defamation litiga-
4. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (no liability for defamatory statement concerning public
duties of a government official unless based upon finding that defendant published the state-
ment with "actual malice"). Sullivan was truly a dividing line: before it, defamation concerns
were left largely to the states, and after it, each libel case was first considered in light of its
possible constitutional implications. For a more complete discussion of this decision, see infra
notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
5. From a defendant's perspective, defamation law since Sullivan can be segmented
roughly into two eras, one expansive, followed by one of either no further expansion or a
pulling back on previous gains. The first era began with Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S.
130 (1967). See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text. It ended with Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. The second
era, on balance much more limiting to defamation defendants, began with Gertz v. Robert
Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), and has continued to the present with Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). See, e.g., Abrams, The Supreme Court
Turns a New Page in Libel, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1984, at 89.
6. One commentator has cited four reasons for the recent proliferation of libel litigation:
The first factor is a new legal and cultural seriousness about the inner self. Tort law
has undergone a relaxation of rules that formerly prohibited recovery for purely emo-
tional or psychic injury, a doctrinal evolution that parallels the growth of the "me-
generation." A second factor is the infiltration into the law of defamation of many of
the attitudes that have produced a trend in tort law over the past twenty years favor-
ing compensation and risk-spreading goals over fault principles in the selection of
liability rules. A third cause of the new era in libel is the increasing difficulty in
distinguishing between the informing and entertaining functions of the media. The
blurring of this line between entertainment and information has affected the method
and substance of communications in important ways and highlights the inadequacies
of the current legal standards governing defamation actions. The final factor is doc-
trinal confusion, caused in large part by a pervasive failure to accommodate constitu-
tional and common law values in a coherent set of standards that is responsive to the
realities of modern communications. That doctrinal confusion is particularly telling
in an environment where cultural trends, such as a heightened concern for the inner
self, and legal trends, such as the trend in tort law in favor of strict liability, both
work against the ideals of free expression.
Smolla, Let the Author Beware. The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel, 132 PA. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1983).
Another comment on the increased frequency of libel suits involving celebrities brought in
recent years was prompted by Retired General William C. Westmoreland's $120-million com-
plaint in 1982 that he was libeled by CBS during a Vietnam documentary. Westmoreland v.
CBS, No. 82 Civ. 7913 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1985) (stipulation of dismissal with prejudice).
According to Professor Vincent Blasi of the Columbia Law School, recently "there's been a
kind of promiscuity in bringing libel suits, based on a feeling that even if the evidence was
fairly flimsy or if the verdict were eventually overturned, the lawsuit had a certain publicity
value." Margolick, Risks in Litigation, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1985, at B7, col. 1. In Westmore-
land, the publicity was immense: the political luminaries from the Vietnam War era who
testified made the trial appear less a discrete libel suit and more a painstaking reevaluation of
that entire period. Following particularly damaging defense testimony and just days prior to
the scheduled conclusion of the four-month trial, General Westmoreland withdrew his com-
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tion has been painful for both plaintiffs and defendants. All parties emerge
from a fray with battered pride and depleted purses.
Foundational and perhaps most problematic in any defamation case is to
determine the appropriate level of first amendment protection to be afforded
to the challenged statement. What a plaintiff must prove to establish a de-
fendant's liability as well as the standard of proof the plaintiff must meet
both hinge on this determination. Moreover, and most crucial financially for
plaint and the case was dismissed. Precipitating the General's withdrawal was a joint state-
ment agreed upon by both sides concerning the allegedly defamatory documentary. Professor
Blasi noted that this outcome may spark fear among potential plaintiffs that a defendant may
make his or her case more effectively, hurtfully, and credibly at trial than in print or on the air.
Id.
7. While exacerbated in recent years, this complexity is not new in defamation law, ac-
cording to some commentators:
[T]here is a great deal of the law of defamation which makes no sense. It contains
anomalies and absurdities. . . and it is a curious compound of a strict liability im-
posed upon innocent defendants, as rigid and extreme as anything found in the law,
with a blind and almost perverse refusal to compensate the plaintiff for real and very
serious harm. . . . The actions for defamation developed according to no particular
aim or plan.
W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, at 771-72.
Another commentator has stated:
The confusion of defamation standards is perhaps best illustrated by identifying
some of the distinctions that must currently be made when a defamation action is
brought. The plaintiffs public- or private-figure status has become crucial, and in
some states the media or nonmedia status of the defendant may also be important. A
defendant may claim a common law privilege in addition to its constitutional privi-
lege. The finding whether the two types of privileges are lost may depend on sepa-
rate determinations of the existence of "malice." Malice currently has two totally
different definitions: common law malice (roughly equivalent to ill will) and New
York Times actual malice (reckless or intentional disregard of the truth).
The complexity inherent in these basic distinctions is indicative of the effect of
imposing new constitutional standards in what had already been a confusing area of
the law.
See Smolla, supra note 6, at 48 (citations omitted). See generally Lewis, New York Times v.
Sullivan Reconsidered. Time to Return to "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 608-14 (1983).
8. CBS and General Westmoreland were each said to have spent an estimated three mil-
lion dollars in connection with their suit. The plaintiff himself is said to have contributed
$20,000 of his own money to mount his case with the balance donated from various public and
private sources. Lardner, Pittsburgh Millionaire Financed Westmoreland's Suit Against CBS,
Wash. Post, Feb. 28, 1985, at A14, col. 1. In the media context, libel litigation alone is not the
only expense associated with defamation. The frequency of libel suits has driven up the costs
of insurance. As an example, Media Professionals Insurance Inc., a major libel insurer, has
reported that its premiums were to be increased 50% to 100%. Hager & Rosenstiel, Libel
Battle.- From Courts to Lawbooks, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 20, 1985, pt. 1, at 12, col. 2 (state-
ment of Larry Worrall, president and general counsel). For a more general account of insur-
ance in libel litigation, see, for example, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, MEDIA INSURANCE
AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1985 (1985).
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both sides, this conclusion also dictates the nature of damages the plaintiff
may recover once he or she proves the defendant's liability.9 Thus, the level
of first amendment protection to which the challenged statement is entitled
is a key decision. To make it, the court views the case as a whole and de-
cides, in essence, whether the case arose in a "public" context or in a "pri-
vate" context. Until now, the Supreme Court has limited this analysis to the
status of the plaintiff, that is, whether the person who was the subject of the
allegedly defamatory statement was a public official or figure, or whether
that person was a private individual.'o Sullivan first established the constitu-
tional parameters of liability for false, defamatory statements." According
to Sullivan and its progeny, a false, defamatory statement made about a pub-
lic official or a public figure'2 would not render the defendant guilty of libel
unless the plaintiff could prove that the statement was made with actual
malice, which the Court defined as knowledge of the statement's falsity or
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.'
3
In Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 4 the second landmark in the modem era of
libel law, the Court rounded out its Sullivan ruling. The suit arose out of
false statements printed in a magazine article and the decision built upon
Sullivan's plaintiff-based test for setting liability prerequisites. It held that a
private libel plaintiff was required to prove only that the defendant was at
fault"5 in publishing a defamatory falsehood to establish the defendant's lia-
bility. In addition, the Gertz Court outlined how the plaintiff's public or
private status determined the nature of allowable damages. The private libel
plaintiff recovered for actual damages to reputation upon a finding of the
defendant's fault. However, if he or she failed to prove actual malice, the
Court would withhold any presumed and punitive damages."
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders 7 changed this plaintiff-cen-
tered approach to damages. In construing Gertz, a splintered Supreme
Court made the content of the statement, in addition to the status of the
plaintiff, a determinant of first amendment protection. The Court ruled that
9. For a fuller discussion of the types of damages that may be awarded in defamation
cases, see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
10. One short-lived exception to this trend was Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). For a
more complete discussion of Rosenbloom, see infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
11. The facts of the case did not dictate that the court rule on the issue of damages.
12. Curtis Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
13. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
15. This fault requirement is irrelevant to establishing strict liability. A finding of fault
presupposes that there was an established duty of care which was breached.
16. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. For a more complete discussion, see infra notes 98-143 and
accompanying text.
17. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
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a private libel plaintiff need not prove a defendant's actual malice as a pre-
requisite to recover punitive damages when the defamatory statement con-
cerns a private rather than a public matter.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (Dun & Bradstreet), a commercial credit reporting
service, "S issued a notice to five of its subscribers that Greenmoss, a Vermont
building contractor, had filed for bankruptcy.1 9 The report was false and
trial testimony revealed that Dun & Bradstreet was at fault. The mistake
occurred when a seventeen-year-old high school student the service hired to
review Vermont's bankruptcy petitions erred by ascribing the ailing financial
health of a former Greenmoss employee to the company itself.2 ° Dun &
Bradstreet's usual system of verifying such information with the business
itself had broken down." It issued a correction within approximately one
week of the initial notice.22 However, disturbed that the service refused to
reveal the recipients of the original report and unconvinced that the second
notice would repair the damage to its financial reputation,2 3 Greenmoss
brought a defamation action in Vermont state court.2 4 The trial jury
awarded Greenmoss $50,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000 in pu-
nitive damages. 2' Dun & Bradstreet moved for a new trial on grounds that
the jury instruction was not consistent with Gertz: the trial judge had not
specifically stated that a private libel plaintiff was required to prove actual
malice to be awarded punitive damages.26 The trial judge granted Dun &
18. Id. Dun & Bradstreet's subscribers are generally creditors of the reported enterprises.
The reports are based on information gathered from the businesses themselves, their banking
and credit sources, trade suppliers, and public records, such as bankruptcy petitions. Green-
moss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 70, 461 A.2d 414, 416 (1983). See gener-
ally Maurer, Common Law Defamation and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 72 GEO. L.J. 95
(1983).
19. 105 S. Ct. at 2941.
20. 143 Vt. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416.
21. 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
22. Id. The second notice stated that a former employee and not the plaintiff had filed for
voluntary bankruptcy. The plaintiff was said to have "continued in business as usual." 143
Vt. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416.
23. 105 S. Ct. at 2942. The bank representative to whom the plaintiff had gone for credit
and who informed him of the Dun & Bradstreet report testified in court that he did not believe
the Dun & Bradstreet assessment. However, the bank declined to consider extending future
credit to the plaintiff until the situation was resolved. Later, the bank terminated the plaintiff's
credit for reasons the representative testified were not related to the Dun & Bradstreet report.
143 Vt. at 71, 461 A.2d at 416. Following issuance of the second notice, any financial creditors
who contacted Dun & Bradstreet about the plaintiff's credit status were told that it had a
"blank rating," which meant that its status was "difficult to classify." Id. at 72, 461 A.2d at
416.
24. 105 S. Ct. at 2942.
25. Id.
26. Id. The relevant portion of the jury instruction stated:
If you find that the Defendant acted in a bad faith towards the Plaintiff in publishing
19861
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Bradstreet's motion, though he voiced doubt that the actual malice standard
applied to nonmedia defendants.27
The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the new trial grant2" ruling that
Dun & Bradstreet was not a media entity and that Gertz was inapplicable to
nonmedia defendants.29 The court conceded that determining which organi-
zations are media and which are not could be difficult in some instances.3 0
Nonetheless, the court found no difficulty expelling Dun & Bradstreet from
the halls of the Fourth Estate, that is, the institutional press, because credit
services report only to a finite number of persons. In addition, to receive
Dun & Bradstreet's service, subscribers were required to keep all credit in-
formation confidential. If Dun & Bradstreet had published reports for pub-
lic consumption, it would be considered a media entity under the court's
the Erroneous Report, or that Defendant intended to injure the Plaintiff in its busi-
ness, or that it acted in a willful, wanton or reckless disregard of the rights and
interests of the Plaintiff, the Defendant has acted maliciously and the privilege is
destroyed. Further, if the Report was made with reckless disregard of the possible
consequences, or if it was made with the knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of its truth or falsity, it was made with malice.
105 S. Ct. at 2943 n.3 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. at 2942 & n. 1. Following Gertz, some states began to consider a defendant's status
as a media or nonmedia entity as a factor for determining the level of first amendment protec-
tion. See Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982); Rowe v. Metz, 195 Colo.
424, 579 P.2d 83 (1978); Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 568
P.2d 1359 (1977). Justice Powell later noted disagreement among the lower courts over when
Gertz should apply. Green moss, 105 S. Ct. at 2942 n. I. For a more complete discussion of this
media/nonmedia issue, see infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
28. Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983). The
interlocutory order certified five questions of law for consideration by the state supreme court.
The court's disposition on the first four negated the need to address the fifth. These questions
were:
(1) Did the trial court err in granting defendant's motion for a new trial on all issues?
(2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, should the court have
entered judgment on the verdict? (3) If the answer to the first question is in the
affirmative, should the court have ordered a new trial on: (a) damages only?
(b) compensatory damages only? (c) punitive damages only? (4) Did the court err in
denying all motions of the defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict? (5) If
the answer to the fourth question is in the affirmative, should the court have:
(a) granted defendant's motion to enter judgment for the defendant on the issue of
punitive damages, notwithstanding the verdict? (b) granted the motion of the defend-
ant for judgment on the issue of compensatory damages, notwithstanding the ver-
dict? (c) granted judgment for the defendant on all issues?
143 Vt. at 70, 461 A.2d at 415. The court answered questions (1) and (2) in the affirmative and
questions (3)(a) through (c) and question (4) in the negative. Id. at 80, 461 A.2d at 421.
29. The Court did not provide a cogent rationale for its conclusion. It did, however,
reject Dun & Bradstreet's assertions that media and nonmedia defendants have "equally com-
pelling" first amendment rights. Id. at 73, 461 A.2d 417.
30. Id. at 73, 461 A.2d at 417.
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analysis. 3' Whether Gertz should apply to nonmedia defendants was a case
of first impression in Vermont and the court turned for guidance to other
jurisdictions that had decided the issue. The Oregon Supreme Court, for
example, had concluded in the negative because "[t]he crucial elements...
which brought the United States Supreme Court into the field of defamation
law are missing."32 As a result, a state's tort law is applied with no constitu-
tional implications. A Vermont state jury could assess punitive damages to
nonmedia defendants even if the defendants had not acted with actual mal-
ice. With respect to Dun & Bradstreet, the court held that the inapplicabil-
ity of Gertz rendered any confusion in the jury instruction harmless error.33
The Supreme Court, in a highly divided decision, affirmed, but on other
grounds. Justice Powell, for the plurality,34 found that the Gertz dictate of
finding actual malice prior to eligibility for punitive damages applied only to
public speech. 35 He asserted that speech on matters of private concern car-
ried much less constitutional weight when balanced against the state's inter-
est in providing recourse for damage to reputation.36 He thus concluded
that the Gertz actual malice requirement should not apply to less constitu-
tionally significant forms of speech.37 Justice Powell then determined that
Dun & Bradstreet's report was merely a matter of private concern and thus
not within the constitutional protections of Gertz. 38 This led the plurality to
conclude that the trial court's jury instructions were adequate and that the
appellate court's reversal of the new trial motion was correct.
In a brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger agreed that Gertz was
limited to matters of public concern. 39 However, he also urged that it be
31. Id.
32. Harley-Davidson Motorsports, 279 Or. at 366, 568 P.2d at 1362-63. "There is no
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a
meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and there is no threat of liability
causing a reaction of self-censorship by the press." Id. at 366, 568 P.2d at 1363.
33. 143 Vt. at 79, 461 A.2d at 421.
34. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined Justice Powell's opinion. Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justice White each wrote separate concurrences.
35. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944. While not asserting that Gertz explicitly held that it
was limited to public speech, Justice Powell drew that conclusion from the context of the case.
Id. at 2944 n.4. See infra note 177 and accompanying text. But see infra notes 222-26.
36. 105 S. Ct. at 2945. Justice Powell chronicled decisions in which the Court had not
always accorded different types of speech equal first amendment protection, including in this
group fighting words, commercial speech, securities information and proxy statements. Id. at
2945 n.5.
37. Id. at 2946. Justice Powell noted that speech on matters of public concern lay at the
heart of first amendment protection. Id. at 2945 (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978)).
38. Id. at 2947. Justice Powell based this factual determination on the "content, form,
and context" of the credit report. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
39. 105 S. Ct. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
1986]
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overruled.4" Justice White began his separate concurrence by noting the vin-
dicatory function of the common law of defamation. He concluded that the
landmark Sullivan case had struck an "improvident balance" between the
public's interest in its officials and those officials' interest in their reputa-
tions." Justice White suggested that both plaintiffs and the press would be
served better by overruling Gertz and reinstating common law adjudication
overseen by a vigilant judiciary allowing only reasonable awards.42
Justice Brennan's dissent 43 construed Gertz unequivocably to prohibit the
damages awarded to Greenmoss. 4 He then criticized the majority's erosion
of that benchmark precedent to arrive at its result. Justice Brennan also
stated that Gertz recognized the fundamental principle that regulations that
may chill protected speech must be no broader than necessary to effectuate
legitimate state interests. 45 Justice Brennan noted that the plurality ad-
judged the state's interest in Gertz46 and that in the instant case to be identi-
cal.47 The dissent concluded, therefore, that the presumed and punitive
damages disallowed in Gertz must similarly be avoided in the instant case
40. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger, who dissented in Gertz, stated
that he continued to believe Gertz was "ill-conceived." See infra note 189 and accompanying
text.
41. 105 S. Ct. at 2950 (White, J., concurring). Justice White suggested alternatives to the
constitutional malice burden Sullivan places on plaintiffs such as limiting recoverable damages,
limiting or forbidding punitive and presumed damages, and allowing a public official to receive
a judgment that a published statement was false. Id. at 2952 (White, J., concurring in judg-
ment). Justice White also appeared to refer to the procedure utilized during the federal district
court case of Sharon v. Time, Inc., No. 83-4660 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 1985). Greenmoss, 105 S.
Ct. at 2950 n.2. In that instance, United States District Judge Abraham D. Sofaer instructed
the jury to make separate, interim verdicts on the elements necessary for Sharon to prevail. In
that case, the elements were defamation, falsity, and actual malice. The jury announced each
result as it was reached. See infra note 254 and accompanying text.
42. 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
43. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2954.
44. 105 S. Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 200-01, 208 and accompa-
nying text.
45. 105 S. Ct. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See the discussion infra notes 204-05 and
accompanying text; see also infra notes 243-44 and accompanying text.
46. The Gertz Court found that the state had a strong, legitimate interest in compensating
private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation. 418 U.S. at 342-45. Such a state interest
was different than that when public figures were involved in defamation cases, primarily be-
cause private persons neither voluntarily expose themselves to increased risk of injury nor have
access to the media to rebut defamatory remarks. Id. at 345. See infra notes 108, 129, and
accompanying text.
47. 105 S. Ct. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The plurality presumably found the state
interest of protecting private persons that was present in Gertz to be identical to that in the
instant case because Greenmoss Builders had the "minuses" characteristic of private persons
noted supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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even if the speech was merely of a private,48 economic49 nature. In addition,
Justice Brennan rejected the majority's "public concern" definition as amor-
phous and irreconcilable with first amendment principles.5° Finally, he as-
serted that credit reporting qualifies as a public concern under any
reasonable definition."'
Following a synopsis of common law defamation, this Note will review
the hallmark of libel law's modern era: the assignment of "public" or "pri-
vate" status to delimit liability and remedies. It will then examine Green-
moss' "public concern" determinant in light of this jurisprudence and the
Greenmoss dissent. This Note will conclude that Greenmoss further con-
founds an already complex area of law. It will then suggest that the compet-
ing interests of free expression and reputation are better accommodated by
preserving Gertz' narrow opportunity for punitive and presumed damages
while vindicating reputation through a combined litigation framework of
separate verdicts and declaratory judgments.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF "PUBLIC" OR "PRIVATE" STATUS OF THE
PLAINTIFF AS A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF LIBEL LITIGATION
From the sixteenth century to the present, libel has been a common law
concern. In the modern libel era, the Supreme Court has carved out liability
and damages standards for particular constitutional consideration and has
otherwise left the state common law undisturbed. This coexistence of the
state common law and the constitutional dimension of defamation has cre-
ated an intricate legal patchwork whose pattern remains incomplete and
sometimes elusive. It is always of interest but not always of comfort for
those who must use it. To more fully understand the implications of Green-
moss, a rudimentary description of the salient common law defamation prin-
ciples52 is appropriate. A survey of changes made by the injection of first
48. 105 S. Ct. at 2960, 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 214 and accompany-
ing text.
49. 105 S. Ct. at 2960-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally infra note 175.
50. 105 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 235-51 and accompanying
text for a more complete discussion of the "public concern" definition.
51. 105 S. Ct. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 213-14 and accompanying
text. The wrangling between the plaintiff and the defendant did not end with the high court
ruling. Following the Supreme Court decision, Dun & Bradstreet sent Greenmoss president
Preston Peters a check for $572,000, which represented the $350,000 verdict and simple inter-
est accumulated over five years. Greenmoss' president contended that the payment should
have been $65,000 more to reflect the interest on the judgment sum compounded annually.
Dun & Bradstreet's general counsel, A. Buffum Lovell, did not agree. Peters remarked that
the parties may again find themselves "'back on square one'-in court." MANHATTEN, INC.,
Sept. 1985, at 9, col. 4.
52. A full exposition of the common law of defamation is beyond the scope of this Note.
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amendment standards into this area of law will follow.
A. State Common Law Action to Federal Constitutional Concern:
The Origin of the Plaintiff-Based Determinant for
First Amendment Protection
To prevail in a common law defamation action, a plaintiff must prove that
a statement which is defamatory5" has been published in a manner in which
the subject can be readily identified.54 Two general categories of defamation
exist under the state common law: libel per se and libel per quod. The for-
mer is, as its name implies, defamatory on its face. In the latter, libel per
quod, the harmful nature is not readily apparent but instead relies on extrin-
sic factors for its defamatory meaning.55
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing liability, a full range of remedies
may be ordered. 6 The court has at its disposal three categories of money
damages: actual or compensatory; punitive or exemplary; and nominal. Ac-
tual damages may be further subdivided into general and special awards.
General awards redress the usual reputational harm one expects a false, de-
famatory statement to cause. As such, this loss may be presumed under
common law. These presumed general damages may include a sum for
mental distress and loss of friends and associates, in addition to loss of em-
ployment and business profits.57 Special damages, the other type of actual
For more comprehensive works on the early development of this area of law, see generally
Donnelly, supra note 1; Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (pts. 1 & 2), 3
COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1903), 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33 (1904). For a more contemporary over-
view of this area, see generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, §§ 111-1 16A.
53. See supra note 3 for a more complete definition of defamation.
54. See D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATION LAW: CASES AND COM-
MENT 197-201 (4th ed. 1984). Publication, in the defamation context, is accomplished when
someone who is not the subject of the statement nor authorized by the subject communicates
the statement to a third party. Id. at 198.
55. For further discussion of these two types of libel, see, e.g., R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER
AND RELATED PROBLEMS 94-101 (1980); see also D. GILLMOR & J. BARRON, supra note 54,
at 189.
56. See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 7.2 (1973). Non-
monetary remedies include injunctions, declaratory judgments and retractions. See R. SACK,
supra note 55, at 361-65; see generally infra notes 254-63 and accompanying text for discussion
of a proposed litigation scheme. Regarding retractions, some states, such as Alabama during
the time of the Sullivan controversy, conditioned a public official's recovery of punitive dam-
ages on the defendant's refusal to issue a retraction.
57. The amount of general or compensatory damages a jury may award to a successful
plaintiff under the common law will often take into consideration some of the following fac-
tors: the nature of the defamation; the form and permanency of the publication; the degree of
circulation; the degree to which the statement was believed; the nature of the plaintiffs reputa-
tion in the community; the defendant's good faith in publishing the defamation; and the de-
fendant's subsequent conduct. D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 513-20. Such a jury award need
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damages, are not readily foreseeable from an injury to reputation. For a
plaintiff to recover these, therefore, he or she must prove that the defama-
tory publication proximately caused the special damage.5" The falsely de-
famed plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages under the common law if the
defendant published the defamatory falsehood with malice, that is, careless
indifference to the plaintiff's rights and feelings or bad faith, ill will, spite, or
bad motives.59 Nominal damages, the third category of damages, are usually
awarded to the victim of a false, defamatory statement who has not claimed
any actual loss. Under common law, the defamation defendant has three
possible defenses: truth, an absolute or qualified privilege to defame, and the
assertion that the challenged statement was merely the expression of an
opinion.6 °
This was the legal apparatus in place on March 29, 1960, when a full-page
editorial advertisement appeared in the New York Times soliciting financial
support for three causes: student civil rights demonstrators, Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.'s legal defense on a pending perjury indictment, and the right-
to-vote campaign. The advertisement also chronicled questionable tactics
police used in confrontations with civil rights activists.6 ' On the strength of
that advertisement, which the courts considered in New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 62 libel law emerged as a constitutional concern.
not reflect an exact financial loss. Instead, it may be a rough estimate of the probable extent of
actual loss anyone is likely to suffer even though such loss is not calculable in concrete terms.
Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494, cert. denied, 405 U.S. 934 (1971).
58. See D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 520-22.
59. See R. SACK, supra note 55, at 329-31. For a brief treatment of the origin of punitive
damages, see Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 78-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting), discussed infra note 96;
see also D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 522-23.
60. Truth of the facts asserted in the challenged statement has evolved as an absolute
defense in virtually all civil libel actions. The underlying rationale here is that no one has a
right to a better reputation than he or she deserves. See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.20 (1956); see also R. SACK, supra note 55, at 129-52. Blanket protec-
tion for publishing defamatory statements is rare. Persons involved in conducting government
business constitute the largest category of those who possess such an absolute privilege to
defame. Qualified privileges, however, will only protect a defendant absent a showing of mal-
ice. For a more complete discussion of the defenses open to defamation defendants, see W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 3, §§ 114-116.
Notably, the Vermont Supreme Court said that the state had not extended to credit report-
ing agencies of that jurisdiction any common law privilege to defame. Greenmoss Builders v.
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 143 Vt. at 76, 461 A.2d at 419.
61. 376 U.S. at 254, 257-58. Entitled Heed Their Rising Voices, the advertisement re-
ferred to "truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas [who] ringed the Alabama
State College Campus" and padlocked a dining hall of protesting students "to starve them into
submission." Id. at 257. It also chronicled acts of repeated arrests and violence against Dr.
King attributable to "Southern violators [of the Constitution]." Id.
62. Id. at 254.
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L.B. Sullivan, the Montgomery commissioner in charge of the police
force, brought his claim against the Times charging that the advertisement
was libelous.6 3 Under Alabama law, he would prevail if he proved that the
Times had published the advertisement and that the advertisement identified
him.' Trial witnesses substantiated Sullivan's assertions.6 5 As a result,
truth of all the facts in the advertisement was the only possible obstacle to
establishing the newspaper's defamation liability. The Times could not as-
sert this truth defense, however, because it was "uncontroverted" that the
advertisement included inaccuracies.66 The jury in the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County did find the advertisement constituted libel per se
under Alabama law.67 Based on this liability, the jury rendered a general
verdict awarding Sullivan $500,000 in damages and Alabama's highest court
affirmed the decision.6 8 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case. 
69
Justice Brennan, for a unanimous Court,7 ° drew the rationale for the re-
versal from the vehement controversy engendered by the Sedition Act more
than a century earlier.7 1 That federal statute made it a crime to publish,
with the intent to defame, a false statement about the President or the Con-
gress. But criticism of public officials for their public conduct was "the cen-
tral meaning of the First Amendment",7 2 Justice Brennan wrote, a truth
crystallized in the national conscience during that time.7 3 Justice Brennan
noted that underlying the state's present-day strong interest in public ex-
63. Id. at 256. Sullivan's claim was deemed without support against four Alabama clergy
named in the advertisement as supportive of the solicitation without their knowledge. Id, at
260, 286.
64. Id. at 262.
65. Id. at 258, 288.
66. Id. at 258.
67. Id. at 262.
68. 273 Ala. 656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962).
69. 376 U.S. at 292.
70. Justices Black and Goldberg filed separate concurrences. Justice Douglas joined both
opinions. Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
71. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. The penalties it imposed were a $5,000 fine
and up to five years in prison. From its inception the statute sparked controversy. So wide-
spread and profound were the objections to it that fines paid under it were returned in accord
with congressional mandate. In addition, President Thomas Jefferson pardoned those con-
victed under its terms. The act had a 1801 sunset clause. Though never passed on by any
court, it is presently treated as if the Supreme Court had ruled that the Act was unconstitu-
tional. 376 U.S. at 276. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960); Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuP. CT. REV. 191,
205, 208-09.
72. 376 U.S. at 273.
73. Id. at 274-76.
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change was "the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." 74
This debate is "essential to the security of the Republic," he concluded. 5
Through it, the people peaceably promote their will, ensuring the govern-
ment's stability and the sovereignty of its citizens. The Court preserved this
central first amendment purpose in its holding that the Constitution dictates
that no public official could prevail in a libel action against critics of his or
her public conduct unless it was proven that the defamatory statement was
made with "actual malice."76 The Court defined actual malice as "knowl-
edge that [the statement] was false or [made] with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."7 7 Thus, no longer would the common law's
motives such as spite and revenge have to catalyze a defamation defendant's
conduct.
This new actual malice test incorporated three corollary principles. It
shifted away from the defendant the burden of proving the truth of a state-
ment. The Court reasoned that legally proving truth is so difficult that possi-
ble government critics would fall silent in fear of meeting this requirement.7 8
Justice Brennan further reasoned that, without relieving the potential de-
fendant of this burden of proving truth legally, the quality of public debate
would be diminished because truthful statements would be eliminated in ad-
dition to false ones. Secondly, the Court stated that the actual malice stan-
dard demanded that such malice be demonstrated with convincing clarity
rather than with any lower level of evidentiary proof.79 Finally, the Court
74. Id. at 270.
75. Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
76. Id. at 279-80.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 279. The Court earlier had said that erroneous statements are inevitable in free
debate and that they must be tolerated if freedom of expression is to have the "breathing
space" that it "need[s] .. .to survive." Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 433 (1963)). Justice Brennan reiterated this point in his Gertz dissent. He concluded that
the Gertz majority would promote media self-censorship. 418 U.S. at 365 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Commentators would fear proving in a court of law that what they believe and know
to be true, could be legally proven as the truth under the strictures of courtroom scrutiny. Id.
at 365-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Sullivan, 376 U.S at 285-86. Some of the issues connected with proving actual malice
with convincing clarity are discussed infra note 87 in the context of Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979). While the Court did not explicitly state the reason for this principle, the apparent
rationale is to nurture a favorable climate for potential government critics by using legal meth-
ods that will shore up the protection of robust expression. The convincing clarity standard has
been described as "a degree of belief greater than the usually imposed burden of proof by a fair
preponderance of the evidence, but less than the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
imposed in criminal cases. . . . It has been said that proof must be 'strong, positive and free
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held that appellate courts are free to comb trial records in proper libel cases
to examine whether challenged statements are worthy of constitutional pro-
tection, and, if they are, to ensure judgments do not intrude on free
expression. 0
Sullivan most profoundly changed the aspects of common law defamation
relevant to this Note by focusing on the status of the defamation plaintiff in
order to determine what type of burdens he or she must carry to prevail. It
thus made it more difficult to prove defamation liability when a person made
a false statement criticizing a government official's performance of his or her
public duties. By instituting the "actual malice" standard, Sullivan also took
the venomous motives out of common law malice.
The Supreme Court expanded the scope of Sullivan in Curtis Publishing v.
Butts. 8 1 Butts concerned the alleged fixing of a 1962 football game between
the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama.12 Justice Harlan,
in the majority opinion, concluded that the Saturday Evening Post, hungry
for a "sophisticated muckraking" reputation, 3 had libeled Wally Butts, the
from doubt' . . . and 'full, clear and decisive' ...." Stone v. Essex County Newspapers,
Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 871, 330 N.E.2d 161, 175 (1975).
80. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285 (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235
(1963)). The Court recommitted itself to its ruling of independent appellate review in Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984). Bose, a product disparagement case,
arose out of the respondent's published assertions that sound from petitioner/manufacturer's
stereo equipment "tended to wander about the room." Id. at 488. The Supreme Court ruled
that, while the record did show falsity in the Consumer Reports article, it did not demonstrate
clear and convincing proof that the falsehood was made with actual malice. Justice Stevens,
for the six-member majority, wrote:
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times v.
Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. . . . It reflects a deeply held convic-
tion that judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise such re-
view in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the
Constitution. . . . Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must independently de-
cide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional thresh-
old that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing
proof of "actual malice."
Id. at 510-11.
Bose, however, came under fire recently by the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985). In a lengthy
opinion reinstating a jury verdict and award against the Washington Post, Judge George
MacKinnon concluded that appellate review should not question a trial court jury's factual
findings. Id. at 107-08. Instead, the inquiry should be limited to whether those findings re-
sulted in actual malice under the law. In dissent, Judge J. Skelly Wright found that such a
narrowly-construed appellate court role would in fact render its independent review "a mi-
rage." Id. at 147 (Wright, J., dissenting). The en banc appellate panel later vacated the major-
ity of that decision, ordering an en banc rehearing. 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
81. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
82. Id. at 135-37.
83. Id. at 158.
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athletic director of the University of Georgia. 84 During his analysis, Justice
Harlan noted briefly a truth so fundamental that it often goes unrecognized:
libel is premised on the content of speech.8 5 This fact taken alone would
appear to invite regulation based upon content; arguably, because emphasis
on speech content permeates libel law, a content classification would intro-
duce no foreign evil into the scheme. However, Justice Harlan then stated
that in his opinion the improper conduct, which produced the false publica-
tion, must remain the focus in any defamation action rather than the content
of the publication. Only in this way, he wrote, can the tension between
speech and press freedoms and libel actions be eased.8 6
Chief Justice Warren's concurrence in Butts is also significant because in it
he specified that the rigorous Sullivan standard applied to public figures as
well as to public officials.8" Thus, in a case involving a public figure plaintiff,
he or she would have to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice in
order to be liable for harm caused by the false, defamatory statement. In so
writing, Chief Justice Warren noted the virtually identical media access of
those in the public eye by election or appointment and those in the public
eye without benefit of official conferral of their status.8"
84. Id. at 158, 161. Justice Harlan, who also wrote for the Court in Butts' companion
case, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), followed the Sullivan lead and articu-
lated in Butts a heightened burden for public figures to bear in libel litigation. 388 U.S. at 155.
In Walker, the Court relied on the same heightened public figure standard to absolve the wire
service from libel liability. The case arose from deadline coverage of actions of political ac-
tivist/retired General Edwin Walker during the rioting surrounding James Meredith's 1962
enrollment at the University of Mississippi. Id. at 140-41. In holding for defendant Associ-
ated Press, the Court noted that its correspondent had been on the scene, his dispatches were
essentially internally consistent, and that there had been need for immediate dissemination of
the information. Id. at 158-59.
85. Id. at 152.
86. Id. at 152-53. Justice Harlan stated specifically:
[N]either the interests of the publisher nor those of society necessarily preclude a
damage award based on improper conduct which creates a false publication. It is the
conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally focus if we are successfully
to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions and the freedom of speech and
press. Impositions based on misconduct can be neutral with respect to content of the
speech involved, free of historical taint, and adjusted to strike a fair balance between
the interests of the community in free circulation of information and those of individ-
uals in seeking recompense for harm done by the circulation of defamatory
falsehood.
Id. (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
88. Id. (Warren, C.J., concurring). The next year in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S.
727 (1968), having expanded the applicability of the New York Times v. Sullivan test to public
figures, the Court refined exactly how the test was to apply in any particular instance. Candi-
date Phil A. St. Amant, in a televised speech, had read an affidavit which contained references
to the passing of money between petitioner Thompson and St. Amant's political opponent. Id.
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Following Butts, the Court had recognized two paths leading to public
status: by virtue of one's office, as in Sullivan, or by virtue of one's position,
as in Butts. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 89 a Philadelphia magazine dis-
tributor prompted the Court to recognize a third path to public status: one's
connection to an issue or event that has captured the public's attention. The
at 728-29. In reversing the Louisiana Supreme Court and finding for St. Amant, Justice White
emphasized that "reckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing." Id. at 731. He also
reiterated the need to show that the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of his publication." Id.
Exactly how to determine when such doubts existed on the part of the defamation defendant
was most prominently addressed in Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). The case arose out
of the plaintiffs attempts to compel discovery. The motion was granted and the defendants
filed an interlocutory appeal. On appeal the case was remanded. Petition for certiorari to
consider the discovery issue was then granted. Because the justices' varying perspectives on
this issue provide insight into their overall attitudes about the institutional press and the con-
flicting interests within defamation law, some of those opinions are noted here. Anthony Her-
bert, a former army colonel, had been the subject of a 1973 CBS program concerning his
allegation of a military cover up of Vietnam atrocities. Id. at 155-56. He sued, claiming that
the program portrayed him as a liar and compromised the value of his forthcoming book. Id.
at 156. Herbert conceded that he was a public figure subject to the dictates of Sullivan. Id.
The district court ruled that he was entitled to engage in pretrial discovery of evidence to
bolster his claim that producer Barry Lando pursued the story without the requisite care and
objectivity. 73 F.R.D. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The appellate court's remand contended
that such a detailed inquiry into the editorial process would certainly compromise the first
amendment principles that Sullivan was fashioned to safeguard. 568 F.2d 974, 984 (2d Cir.
1977). The Supreme Court reversed. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
Justice White wrote for the majority that evidence concerning one's state of mind and the
editorial process are not new and that the court of appeals' decision to grant an effectively
absolute privilege to the journalist's editorial process was an unwarranted departure from its
previous rulings. See 441 U.S. at 161-69. He reasoned that erecting "an impenetrable barrier"
into the thoughts, opinions and conclusions of the publishers would effectively strip the plain-
tiff of his or her ability to prove actual malice with convincing clarity. Id. at 170. This, in
turn, would unacceptably skew the balance struck in Sullivan between freedom of expression
and an individual's right to a good reputation. While Justice White conceded that such an
inquiry might unearth new media liability, he concluded that the first amendment would not
be implicated because only speech containing reckless error would be discouraged. Id. at 173.
Justice Brennan's partial dissent advocated the existence of an editorial privilege on a case-by-
case basis following a plaintiff's prima facie showing of defamatory falsehood to a trial judge.
Id. at 197 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that "actual malice" as used in the Sullivan test is
wholly divorced from any vile motives on the part of the publisher. Id. at 199 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Therefore, he concluded that inquiry into the editorial process was simply not
relevant to a libel suit in which Sullivan is the standard. Id. Justice Marshall, in a separate
dissent, suggested foreclosing discovery of the substance of editorial conversations because
other methods of uncovering reckless disregard are available. Id. at 209-10 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The case was recently dismissed when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered the libel claim on its merits. Herbert v. Lando, No. 85-7014 (2d
Cir. Jan. 15, 1986).
89. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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Court reevaluated its previous decisions to pinpoint whether, at base, it was
truly the event or issue rather than the person that triggered the heightened
liability requirements of Sullivan. A local radio station referred to Rosen-
bloom, the magazine distributor, as one of several "girlie-book peddlers"9 °
engaged in the "smut literature racket."
9 1
At the outset, Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality of a fragmented
Court,92 reasoned that enforcement of obscenity laws was an issue of public
interest.93 He discarded as a strained legal fiction the public figure/private
individual dichotomy in defamation cases.94 Justice Brennan concluded that
the nature of the event, and not the status of the plaintiff, was the key deter-
minant of the level of first amendment protection to be accorded the chal-
lenged statement. 95 Thus, the plurality held that Sullivan's rigorous actual
malice standard also applied when a private libel plaintiff was embroiled in
an event of public or general concern.
96
Rosenbloom changed defamation law by transferring the Court's focus
90. Id. at 34.
91. Id.
92. The decision lacked solid support from its inception. Justice Douglas did not partici-
pate in the case. Of the eight justices deciding it, five registered separate opinions with each
opinion gaining the support of no more than three justices. In fact, the fragmented state of the
Court in Rosenbloom actually swayed at least one vote in Gertz. In a brief concurring opinion
there, Justice Blackmun stated:
The Court was sadly fractionated in Rosenbloom. A result of that kind inevitably
leads to uncertainty. I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court to come to
rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that elimi-
nates the unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity. If my vote were not
needed to create a majority, I would adhere to my prior view [expressed in the Bren-
nan Rosenbloom plurality]. A definitive ruling, however, is paramount.
418 U.S. at 354 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
93. 403 U.S. at 40.
94. Id. at 41.
95. Id. at 43. Justice Brennan observed that:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less
so merely because a private individual is involved. . . .The public's primary inter-
est is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and the
content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety.
Id.
96. Id. at 52. Rosenbloom's dissenting opinions are perhaps more significant than the
plurality result. In his dissent, Justice Harlan noted that private persons are less likely to
secure access to channels of communication to rebut defamatory falsehoods. Id. at 70 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). In addition, he stated that those who exercise freedom of speech and press have
a duty of reasonable care. He thereby rejected strict liability. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting). He
also construed the first amendment to limit punitive damages, even in private libel cases, to
those situations in which actual malice is proved. Id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In addi-
tion, Justice Harlan would "hold unconstitutional, in a private libel case, jury authority to
award punitive damages which is unconfined by the requirement that these awards bear a
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from the libel plaintiff, where it had been riveted since Sullivan, to the event
giving rise to the litigation. This pronouncement, weakened as it was by the
host of differing opinions, also failed to provide guidelines for determining
the existence of an event of public or general interest.97 In addition, the
Rosenbloom plurality specifically ruled only on the issue of sustaining a libel
action, and not on the issue of damages. But at the same time Rosenbloom
was being considered by the Supreme Court, a case that addressed both of
these issues was working its way through the federal court system.
B. Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc. Reaffirms the Court's Commitment to the
Plaintiff-Based Determinant for First Amendment Protection
In Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc.,98 the Court furthered its "continuing effort
to define the proper accommodation between [the] competing concerns" that
defamation law and the first amendment present.99 The Court decided that
a defendant who publishes a defamatory falsehood about a private individual
may not escape liability simply by claiming the expression is privileged be-
cause it involves an issue of public interest. " In addition, the Court held
that the private libel plaintiff could recover only compensatory damages ab-
sent proof of the defendant's actual malice. 10 The plaintiff in the case, at-
reasonable and purposeful relationship to the actual harm done." Id. at 77 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Stewart suggested that the plurality's public
or general interest test for determining Sullivan's applicability to a defamation case would
require the courts to determine "what information is relevant to self-government." Id. at 79
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent found that this result would ill serve private individuals
"thrust into the public eye by the distorting light of defamation," and not advance the state's
interest in protecting them. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus, both Justices Harlan and
Marshall articulated the same concerns on the issue of liability. Justice Marshall further ex-
plained that punitive damages resulted from an 18th-century English finding that such dam-
ages were within the jury's broad discretion. Id. at 82 (Marshall, J., dissenting). These awards
evolved essentially as private fines, serving the same deterrent and punitive functions as crimi-
nal penalties. In these penalties Justice Marshall saw the potential for self-censorship by the
press heightened by jury discretion limited only by the requirement that awards not be exces-
sive. The dissent reasoned that "the utility of the discretion in fostering society's interest in
protecting individuals from defamation is at best vague and uncertain. These awards are not
to compensate victims; they are only windfalls." Id. at 84 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Going
further than Justice Harlan, Justice Marshall emphasized that the most prudent course for
both plaintiffs and defendants would be to do away with punitive and presumed damages com-
pletely, restricting awards to proven, actual losses. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. The Greenmoss dissent similarly criticized the Greenmoss plurality for its lack of
guidelines. See infra note 215 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 244-47 and accom-
panying text.
98. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
99. Id. at 342.
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id. at 349-50.
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torney Elmer Gertz, had sought damages for the family of a youth killed in
1968 by a Chicago police officer. The Gertz suit arose out of the erroneous
charges published in the John Birch Society periodical American Opinion
that Gertz was a "Leninist" who had helped plan the violence at the Demo-
cratic National Convention in Chicago as part of a conspiracy to promote
communism. 102
Justice Powell, writing for the five-member majority, articulated the two
competing societal values at issue as the need to avoid self-censorship by the
news media1°3 and the need to compensate individuals "for the harm in-
flicted on them by defamatory falsehood[s]." 1" He acknowledged the hard-
ship Sullivan worked upon public figures who were victims of defamatory
falsehoods."5 Moreover, he concluded that the position advocated in Ro-
senbloom simply pushed Sullivan too far: it unacceptably compromised the
state interest in protecting private individuals.1o6 At the base of this conclu-
sion was Justice Powell's acknowledgment that self-help is the "first rem-
edy''107 open to any victim of a defamatory falsehood. He reasoned that
private individuals generally have less media access and therefore they are
less able to help themselves by attracting the media machinery to counter the
falsehoods. They are more vulnerable to defamation injury and thus more
deserving of recovery. 08 Moreover, the Court stated that Rosenbloom's
public or general interest test not only inadequately serves plaintiffs, but
treats defendants unjustly as well. Under Rosenbloom, a private individual
caught up in a matter of general or public interest could not sustain a libel
102. Id. at 326. The monthly magazine in the 1960's had mounted an effort to warn Amer-
icans of a conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement officials and to replace them with a
nationwide, communist-inspired police force. Id. at 325. As part of this effort, the magazine
commissioned an article on the trial of Richard Nuccio, the officer charged with murdering the
Chicago youth. The assertions about Gertz were a part of this article. Id. The magazine was
sold nationwide with reprints distributed in Chicago. Id. at 327.
103. Id. at 341.
104. Id. Defamatory falsehoods were the issue in Gertz. Trial testimony revealed that
many of the article's statements about Gertz were patently false. Id. at 326. In addition,
American Opinion's managing editor had not attempted to verify or substantiate the charges.
Id. at 327. An editorial preface to the article stated that its author conducted "extensive re-
search" into the case. Id. Gertz' picture appeared in the article with the caption: "Elmer
Gertz of Red Guild harasses Nuccio." Id.
105. Id. at 342.
106. Id. at 346. Justice Powell then reiterated a principal point of Justice Marshall's Ro-
senbloom dissent, that a general or public interest test would require the state and federal
judiciary to make ad hoc decisions as to what information is important to self-government.
See supra note 96.
107. 418 U.S. at 344.
108. Id. at 344, 345. This, of course, has been a recurring, consistent rationale for the
different treatment of private individuals and public figures. See supra note 46 and accompa-
nying text; see also supra note 96. Cf infra note 121 and accompanying text.
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action without meeting the Sullivan standard. As a result, a private individ-
ual, perhaps the object of an intense flurry of media attention, would be
swiftly deprived of it and of any means of help. That person would also be
stripped of any judicial means of compensation without proving actual mal-
ice.1 09 At the same time, a defendant who had exercised all reasonable care,
but nonetheless mistakenly presented false information on a matter wholly
unrelated to an issue of public or general interest, could be penalized by
presumed and punitive damages. 1 0 Besides the undesirable outcomes them-
selves, the precursor of each one is an independent evil, the exercise of deter-
mining whether there exists an issue of public or general interest.'"
Justice Powell contended that a test for liability less burdensome than the
actual malice standard better met the interest of the state in gaining compen-
sation for a defamed private citizen's injury to reputation on the one hand
and of the media".2 to publish without strict liability for all defamatory
statements on the other."' Under this ruling, individual states would be
free to fashion their own standards for liability in cases involving private
libel plaintiffs." 4 However, to accommodate the other side of the scale, the
109. 418 U.S. at 346.
110. Id. This is another example of the intellectual thicket of libel law that Greenmoss
exacerbates. See infra note 221 and accompanying text. It is also appropriate that this anoma-
lous result arises under the Rosenbloom subject matter classification. This fact gives further
credence to the assertion that the two tests are similar. See infra notes 237, 244, and accompa-
nying text.
I 11. The danger of this prospect was discussed most convincingly by Justice Marshall in
his Rosenbloom dissent. See supra note 96.
112. The specific reference in Gertz to communications media spawned state litigation on
whether its holding had equal force when the defendant was not a member of the media.
However, it is unlikely that such a distinction was intended. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1983)
The Court suggested the possibility of a difference in libel standards between the
speech and press clauses of the first amendment by specifically using such terms as
"publisher," "broadcaster," and "press" in this part of its holding. However the
reference was only an offhand one and in fact there may be no distinctions between
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
Id. at 950-51. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMUNICATIONS LAW 40-43 (1977) (here-
inafter COMMUNICATIONS LAW] for a survey of how states have decided the applicability of
Gertz to nonmedia defendants and private matters. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
decide this issue, the Court, and Justice Stewart in particular, have addressed it. See infra
notes 160, 174, 200-03, and accompanying text.
113. 418 U.S. at 347-48. While a comprehensive examination of the correctness of ever
allowing punitive damages in defamation litigation is not the main focus of this Note, it is of
great concern to jurists and other scholars and observers. See supra note 96; see also infra
notes 252, 264.
114. Since Gertz was decided, many states have chosen their own standards for defamation
liability. Several have settled on simple negligence. Other, undecided states, have indicated a
tendency toward standards less strict than actual malice. A few states have chosen the actual
malice standard. COMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 112, at 32-35.
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Court prohibited liability without proof of fault' 15 and permitted the award
of damages only to compensate actual injury when a state instituted any test
less arduous than actual malice." t 6 Presumed and punitive damages were
barred without the actual malice showing.
The Court expressed several reasons for denying the opportunity for puni-
tive and presumed damages. First, Justice Powell feared that the "largely
uncontrolled discretion" of juries to award presumed damages would com-
pound the potential for compromising the exercise of first amendment free-
doms." 7 Justice Powell was even more critical of punitive damages in the
defamation context. He noted that jury discretion in such awards "unneces-
sarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship." ' 8 He also observed
that the awards themselves are "wholly irrelevant" to the governmental in-
terest, compensating harm to reputation, that underlies a negligence stan-
dard for private defamation victims unable to help themselves." 9
This decision thus redirected a court's attention onto the person about
whom the defamatory statement was made to determine whether the Sulli-
van standard created liability. This status of the plaintiff also determined the
nature of allowable damages. Justice Powell also noted, however, that few
persons have achieved the fame to render them public figures in all in-
stances.' 20 More commonly, he explained, an individual may be a public
figure for purposes of a particular public controversy and the limited range
of issues associated with it. 12' Thus, the Court's opinion recognized the im-
plicit tie between public figure status and the existence of an issue of public
interest.'22 For the instant case, however, the Court ruled that Gertz was
not a public figure for the issues involved and remanded the case for a new
115. 418 U.S. at 346-47.
116. Id. at 350.
117. Id. at 349. Justice Powell also noted the potential for presumed damages to be used to
punish unpopular opinions. Id. Additionally, he indicated that the state had no substantial
interest in providing private individuals with "gratuitous" awards in excess of any actual in-
jury. Id.
118. Id. at 350.
119. Id. Justice Powell suggested that such awards "are not compensation for injury. In-
stead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence." This sentiment was expressed by Justice Marshall in his Rosenbloom
dissent. See supra note 96.
120. 418 U.S. at 351.
121. Id. Justice Powell noted that such a person "voluntarily injects himself or is drawn
into a particular public controversy." Id. For a discussion of this "limited public figure"
principle in later cases, see Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See infra notes
145-63 and accompanying text for a more complete discussion of this issue.
122. This recognition indeed is one, perhaps the only, meritorious quality of the Green moss
public concern determinant. For a fuller discussion, see infra note 234.
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trial. 123
In a brief dissent, Chief Justice Burger characterized the Gertz majority as
abandoning defamation law's "traditional thread" of strict liability for pri-
vate libel plaintiffs1 24 by sustaining media liability only on a showing of neg-
ligence in publishing defamatory statements concerning private
individuals. 25 His position appeared to have been based on the fact that
Gertz was an attorney handling an unpopular case. The Chief Justice was
particularly troubled that the Gertz requirement of negligence for liability
could conceivably undercut an accused's right to counsel by making attor-
neys on societally unacceptable cases ripe targets for irresponsible members
of the media.'26
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority by calling for continuation of
the Sullivan actual malice standard of liability for private individuals in-
volved in an event of public or general interest.' 27 He began by refuting, as
he had in his Rosenbloom opinion, 128 the public figure's enhanced media
access, the primary rationale for treating private individuals differently from
public officials or public figures. 129 Justice Brennan also rejected the asser-
tion that the judiciary would be totally incapable of divining which matters
are of general or public interest.' ° While difficult in some instances, he
noted that judges would find guidance in the growing body of state case law
applying this public or general interest test.131 As to damages, Justice Bren-
nan maintained that simply limiting money awards to actual injury did not
adequately protect the first amendment: a damage award, regardless of its
name, must still be paid. Even actual damages are too heavy a burden for
123. 418 U.S. at 352.
124. Id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 45-46.
129. 418 U.S. at 362-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found that the ability
public persons have to attract the media is tenuous at best and "will depend on the same
complex factor on which the ability of a private individual depends: the unpredictable event of
the media's continuing interest in the story." Id. at 363 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 46-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). In addition, he maintained that
voluntariness in the way public figures come to prominence is an invalid way to distinguish
these persons from private individuals. In Justice Brennan's view, everyone, whether voluntar-
ily or not, is exposed to some degree of public view; public figures have not flung wide their
intimate lives nor private individuals "carefully shrouded" theirs. Id. at 364 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
130. Id. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This assertion is also appropriate with reference
to Greenmoss due to the Supreme Court's failure to promulgate guidelines in that case.
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many small news organizations to bear.' 32
Justice White, in a separate dissent,' 33 reached a result vastly different
from that of Justice Brennan. In essence, Justice White urged retention of
the common law's libel per se. He did so in recognition of the law in the fifty
states that private citizens deserve the protection of their reputations that
strict liability provides for facially libelous falsehoods.' 34 He summarized
the early development of defamation law' and repudiated the sweeping
changes the Court had made 36 without benefit of proper briefing or oral
argument. 137 Noting that common law defamation and its consequences
were in place when the first amendment was adopted,' 38 Justice White ob-
served that he saw no evidence that the first amendment nor "present cir-
cumstances" required the changes the majority had made.' 39 Justice White
viewed Sullivan as wholly consistent with the first amendment aim of pro-
tecting critics of government. The Gertz majority, however, had gone far
afield of this first amendment purpose by increasing the burden on private
libel plaintiffs to establish liability without regard to the award of damages.
Instead, Justice White suggested that limiting general and punitive damages
would be a better approach to protect the media from large libel judg-
ments."0 Justice White also criticized as without constitutional significance
132. Id. at 367-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 389 (White, J., dissenting).
135. Of particular note, in Justice White's view, is the vindicatory function fulfilled by the
common law of defamation:
At the very least, the rule allowed the recovery of nominal damages for any defama-
tory publication actionable per se and thus performed "a vindicatory function by
enabling the plaintiff publicly to brand the defamatory publication as false. The salu-
tary social value of this rule is preventive in character since it often permits a de-
famed person to expose the groundless character of a defamatory rumor before harm
to the reputation has resulted therefrom."
Id. at 372 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 comment
b (1938)).
136. Justice White highlighted the changes. First, the plaintiff must prove fault in addition
to the mere publication of a libel per se. Id. at 375-76 (White, J., dissenting). Second, the
plaintiff must prove actual injury despite the inherent harmful nature of some libels and the
difficulty of proving such injury. Id. at 376 (White, J., dissenting). Third, a plaintiff is fore-
closed from even a judgment for nominal damages, which would at least provide the "judicial
declaration that the publication was indeed false," due to this newly-installed requirement to
prove fault in addition to falsity. Id. (White, J., dissenting). Fourth, in instances of libel per
quod, general damages could no longer be awarded without proof of special injury. Id. (White,
J., dissenting). Finally, punitive damages would be prohibited even if ill will or a vile motive
existed if the Sullivan actual malice test was not met. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 381-82 (White, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 376-77 (White, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 391 (White, J., dissenting).
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any distinction between reckless disregard of the truth and negligence,
though the majority would allow punitive damages for the former and bar
them in the latter instance.14 Moreover, Justice White concluded, the in-
dependent appellate court examination established by Sullivan safeguards
against excessive judgments that would be "a forbidden intrusion" on free
expression. 14 2 "For almost 200 years," he asserted, "punitive damages and
the First Amendment have peacefully coexisted."'
' 4 3
These well-reasoned dissenting opinions notwithstanding, Gertz confirmed
that a heightened threshold for liability of defamation defendants was deter-
mined by the public or private status of the libel plaintiff rather than the
event with which the plaintiff was involved. In so doing, Gertz repudiated
Rosenbloom, though it did not expressly overrule it. Gertz also firmly estab-
lished that eligibility for particular damage awards is to be apportioned ac-
cording to the plaintiff's status.'" The Court next addressed how one is
adjudged either a public figure or private individual in defamation litigation.
C. Skeletal Requirements for Determining Plaintiff's "Public" or
"Private" Status
In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 145 the Supreme Court held that the estranged
wife of a wealthy industrialist was not a public figure, even though she was
at the center of a much celebrated divorce and had held press conferences
during the course of the judicial proceedings. The Court gave two specific
reasons for its conclusion: first, the plaintiff, Firestone, had not chosen to
publicize her marriage troubles, but instead had been compelled to enter the
public judicial forum to dissolve the relationship;' 46 and, second, while di-
141. Id. at 396 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White found it difficult to identify a violation
of the constitution when a defamation defendant is subject to punitive damages merely to deter
departure "from those standards of care ordinarily followed in the publishing industry." In his
view, such a violation is particularly difficult to find when common law malice is present. Id.
(White, J., dissenting). See infra notes 194-95 and accompanying text for Justice White's pro-
posal for a preferred approach to defamation law. No one welcomes falsehoods and no one
welcomes an irresponsible press. However, to find no constitutional wrong in this deterrence is
to diminish the breathing space that Sullivan preserved. Finding no such wrong also severs the
freedoms of speech and press, distinguishing between media and nonmedia entities. Greenmoss
did not forthrightly address this issue. However, taken as a whole, the decision reaffirms that
the source of speech should not dictate its constitutional protection. See infra note 176 and
accompanying text.
142. Id. at 397-98 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285). See supra
note 80 and accompanying text.
143. 418 U.S. at 398 (White, J., dissenting).
144. For an enlightening, personal account of this seminal case, see Gertz, Gertz on Gertz:
Reflections on the Landmark Libel Case, TRIAL, Oct. 1985, at 66.
145. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
146. Id. at 454.
[Vol. 35:883
Lowered First Amendment Protection
vorce battles of the rich may be of interest to some members of the public,
they are not the type of public controversy contemplated in Gertz to render
one a limited public figure.147 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
noted that to characterize a divorce proceeding as a bona fide public contro-
versy and to adjudge Firestone a public figure on that ground would revive
Rosenbloom. 14 As a result of the finding that the plaintiff was a private
individual, the Firestone Court held that the account of the divorce judgment
appearing in Time magazine would not be accorded Sullivan's first amend-
ment protections. The Court remanded the case to determine if the fault
required by Gertz as a prerequisite to recover compensatory damages in fact
existed. 49
The Court strengthened the criterion of voluntary action to become a pub-
lic figure outside of the strictly judicial context in Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n.' 5 The Supreme Court built on Firestone's dictate that a libel plaintiff
may not become a public figure as a result of being compelled to act.
Reader's Digest asserted that Wolston's refusal in 1958 to testify before a
grand jury investigating Soviet intelligence matters rendered him a public
figure as to that subject.'' Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected
this contention by stating that Wolston's choice not to answer the subpoena
could not be equated with injecting himself into the forefront of a public
controversy.' 52 Far from volunteering to be a public figure, Justice Rehn-
quist found that Wolston had been "dragged unwillingly into the
controversy."1
53
This same reasoning is also at the heart of Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 154
decided the same day as Wolston. By conferring the "Golden Fleece of the
Month Award"' 55 on particular funding agencies, Senator William
Proxmire denigrated the government support of a behaviorial scientist's re-
search as a waste of taxpayer's money.' 56 Hutchinson, the scientist, brought
suit for damage to his professional and academic reputation. 57 In addition
to speaking about the "award" in a speech on the Senate floor, Senator
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 464.
150. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
151. Id. at 166. The refusal was said to be due to ill health. Id. at 168.
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id.
154. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
155. Id. at 114.
156. Id. Hutchinson researched the objective measures of aggression in primates. Id. at
115. Several agencies were interested in his findings to solve problems that arise when humans
are confined in close quarters for long periods. Id.
157. Id. at 118.
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Proxmire cited it in two newsletters, a press release, and on a television inter-
view show, although Hutchinson was not always referred to by name.'
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court had
never decided the question of whether the Sullivan standard applied to an
individual defendant in addition to a media defendant. 5 9 The Court also
declined to do so in the instant case concluding that Hutchinson was not a
public figure. This rendered unnecessary a decision on whether the Sullivan
standard might apply to an individual, such as the Senator.' 6 ° The Court
reasoned that neither successfully competing for federal research grants nor
gaining access to media after the "Golden Fleece" award announcement ren-
dered Hutchinson a public figure.1 6' The Chief Justice also concluded that
no specific public controversy existed.' 62  Thus, Hutchinson was not re-
quired to adhere to the more rigorous Sullivan standard to prevail.
63
The Firestone-Wolston-Proxmire trilogy reaffirms once again the Court's
adherence to the plaintiff-based determinant for shaping defamation litiga-
tion. Despite the continued commitment to the plaintiff-based approach that
these cases represent, however, making the approach actually work remains
an unattained goal. These cases, Firestone in particular, underscore just how
difficult it is to decide whether a public controversy exists, and if so, how the
libel plaintiff has acted in relation to it. The Supreme Court simply has not
provided concrete, comprehensive guidelines to aid trial courts in this task.
As a result, they have produced confused, sometimes conflicting results.'
64
158. Id. at 116-17.
159. Id. at 133 n.16.
160. Id. See, e.g., supra note 112 and accompanying text.
161. 443 U.S. at 134-36.
162. Id. at 135. The Chief Justice observed that at most respondents "point to concern
about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by most and relates to most
public expenditures; it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure." Id.
163. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 136. Justice Brennan
dissented on the ground that he viewed legislators' criticism of unnecessary government ex-
penditures as a legislative act protected by the constitution's speech or debate clause. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The district court had earlier granted a summary judgment for Sena-
tor Proxmire that the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had affirmed, 579
F.2d 1027 (1978), precipitating the high court's hearing the case.
164. One court articulated the difficulty: "How and where do we draw a line between
public figures and private individuals? They are nebulous concepts. Defining public figures is
much like trying to nail a jellyfish to the wall." Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., 411 F. Supp.
440, 443 (S.D. Ga. 1976). As to the public controversy requirement instituted by the Fire-
stone-Hutchinson-Wolston trilogy, one observer noted that the Court had left five issues un-
resolved: the definition of the requirement itself; the degree of its particularity; the required
nexus between the voluntariness and public controversy considerations in the public figure test;
whether the public controversy must exist prior to the alleged defamation; and, which party
was assigned the burden of proof. Note, Defining a Public Controversy in the Constitutional
Law ofDefamation, 69 VA. L. REV. 931, 942-44 (1983). As a result, the observer concluded,
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In addition, the few Supreme Court contributions on the plaintiff-based de-
terminant that do exist apply more directly to liability rather than to dam-
ages. Until now, the absence of direct Supreme Court guidance has been
even more pronounced on this issue. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders 165 the Supreme Court offered the first post-Gertz analysis for dam-
age award eligibility in libel litigation.
II. DUN & BRADSTREET, INC. v. GREENMOSS BUILDERS: "PUBLIC" AND
"PRIVATE" STATUS OF SPEECH DETERMINES NATURE OF
ALLOWABLE DAMAGES
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders began when a Waitsfield,
Vermont developer of custom homes and condominiums brought a defama-
tion action charging that Dun & Bradstreet issued a credit report that falsely
represented the company's financial health to five of the agency's subscrib-
ers.' 66 Dun & Bradstreet lost that action and was assessed $50,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $300,000 in punitive damages.167 It did, however,
successfully move for a new trial on the grounds that the court's jury in-
structions did not stress the Gertz dictate that a private libel plaintiff must
prove actual malice to be awarded punitive and presumed damages. 168 The
Vermont Supreme Court reversed the new trial grant, ruling that Gertz did
not apply to nonmedia entities. 169 That decision focused on the reasoning
that no constitutional implications attach when a defamation defendant is
not a media member because no threat of compromise to robust public de-
bate exists.' 7
The Supreme Court ruled that a private libel plaintiff need not demon-
strate that a libel defendant published a defamatory statement with actual
malice as a prerequisite to recovering punitive or presumed damages, when
the defamatory statement was a matter of private rather than public con-
cern. Greenmoss is a distinct departure from the established Gertz jurispru-
lower courts generally have relied on an ad hoc determination of existence of a public contro-
versy. Id. at 944-50. The result has often been confusion and inconsistency. One of the at-
tempts at formulating an objective approach was Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627
F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980). See Note, Waldbaum v. Fairchild
Publications, Inc.: Giving Objectivity to the Definition of Public Figures, 30 CATH. U.L. REV.
307 (1981); see also Note, Public Figures, Private Figures and Public Interest, 30 STAN. L. REV.
157 (1977).
165. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
166. Id. at 2941.
167. Id. at 2942.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. For a detailed discussion of the facts of the case and the holdings of the lower courts,
see supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
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dence and its scope was somewhat of a surprise' 7 ' to those familiar with its
history. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Vermont Supreme
Court'72 and heard arguments in the case during its 1983 term. Thereafter,
the Court restored the case to its calendar for reargument during the next
term and solicited briefs on two issues:' 73 first, whether the Sullivan and
Gertz rulings concerning presumed and punitive damages should apply to
suits against nonmedia defendants;' and, second, whether these same rul-
ings should also apply to speech of a commercial or economic nature. 7 '
171. See, e.g., Kamen, Supreme Court Broadens Basis For Libel Awards, Wash. Post, June
27, 1985, at A10, col. 5.
172. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 464 U.S. 959 (1983).
173. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 104 S. Ct. 3583 (1984).
174. Id.
175. Id. The anticipated result on this issue was a Supreme Court determination as to
whether credit reports are "commercial speech." Such speech has had distinct first amend-
ment treatment through the commercial speech doctrine. That doctrine is traced back to a
1942 case in which an ordinance that prohibited public distribution of a handbill advertising a
decommissioned Navy submarine exhibited for profit was upheld as constitutional. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed that municipalities may not unduly burden public distribution of
information and opinions. The Court also held, however, "[w]e are equally clear that the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertis-
ing." Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). This conclusion, that commercial
speech was outside the protection of the first amendment, remained in force for more than 30
years. Then a series of cases began to chip away at it; now little remains of the commercial
speech doctrine. This progression began in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In that
case, the conviction of a newspaper editor who accepted advertisements for low-cost abortions
in New York was set aside as infringing constitutionally-protected speech. "The central as-
sumption made by the Supreme Court of Virginia was that the First Amendment guarantees of
speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial advertisements. Our cases, however,
clearly establish that speech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because it
appears in that form." Id. at 818 (citations omitted). The trend continued with Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). A law
making a Virginia pharmacist guilty of unprofessional conduct for advertising prices of pre-
scription drugs was struck down as violating the first and fourteenth amendments. The Court
called "beyond serious dispute" that: "speech does not lose its First Amendment protection
because money is spent to project it . . . . Speech likewise is protected even though it is
carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit and even though it may involve a solicitation to
purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money." Id. at 761 (citations omitted). The Court
noted that the "purely economic" interest of the advertiser does not disqualify him or her from
first amendment protection. Id. at 762. Moreover, "the particular consumer's interest in the
free flow of commercial information . . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest
in the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763. The Court also called the free flow of
commercial information "indispensable" in fostering a consumer's intelligent economic deci-
sions. Id. at 765. Justice Blackmun then stated:
And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that
system ought to be regulated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that
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However, Justice Powell's plurality opinion, in which Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor joined, did not clearly resolve either of these questions.' 76
Justice Powell focused instead on the public or private status of the defam-
atory statement. His legal conclusion was that Gertz did not apply to issues
of private concern. He arrived at that conclusion by first interpreting Sulli-
van and its progeny, particularly Gertz, as restricted to the public issues
those cases involved. '77 Justice Powell found expression on such issues to be
at the core of first amendment concerns. 178 He then considered the applica-
bility of Gertz to private matters outside of this core first amendment pur-
pose. In an assertion disputed by the dissent, Justice Powell emphasized that
"nothing" in Gertz indicated that the balance of the state's interest in award-
ing presumed and punitive damages to redress harm to reputation on one
side and the harmful effect of such damages on public speech on the other
would be struck in precisely the way it was in Gertz "regardless of the type
of speech involved."' 79 In fact, speech not of the core first amendment vari-
ety,18 ' Justice Powell maintained, warranted different treatment under
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Other recent decisions which have weakened the commercial speech doctrine are Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down the Arizona State Bar disciplinary rule banning
all attorney advertising); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557 (1980) (New York Public Service Commission regulations that totally ban promotional
advertising by electric utility, for the purpose of increasing conservation, stricken as
overbroad).
176. See Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2958-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan main-
tained that:
The free speech guarantee gives each citizen an equal right to self-expression and
to participation in self-government. . . . Accordingly, at least six Members of this
Court (the four who join this opinion and Justice White and the Chief Justice) agree
today that, in the context of defamation law, the rights of the institutional media are
no greater and no less than those enjoyed by other individuals or organizations en-
gaged in the same activities.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan then noted that Justice Pow-
ell's opinion "does not expressly reject the media/nonmedia distinction, but does expressly
decline to apply that distinction to resolve this case." Id. at 2959 n.10 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
177. Id. at 2943-44.
178. Id. at 2945-46. Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982)
(speech on public issues occupies "highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values")
(quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)); accord First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (speech on matters of public concern is "at the heart of the First Amend-
ment's protection"); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (The constitutional safeguard "was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.") (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
179. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2944.
180. Id. at 2945. Underlying Justice Powell's analysis was the principle that all speech was
not equal and thus accorded identical first amendment protection. He noted that obscene
speech, fighting words, and commercial speech have all been provided no protection or less
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Gertz. With private rather than public concerns to be considered in libel
litigation, the balance shifted: the interest in awarding presumed and puni-
tive damages outweighed the interest in free expression on such private con-
cerns. 18' Finally, Justice Powell suggested that the futility of proving actual
damage to reputation necessitated the award of presumed damages in order
to provide adequate protection for something as precious as one's good
name. 1
82
Justice Powell next addressed whether Dun & Bradstreet's credit notice
constituted a matter of public concern. 183  In deciding that the report's
"content, form and context"' 8 4 revealed it to be a purely private matter,
Justice Powell found three factors persuasive: the report was of interest
solely to the speaker and its specific business audience; I8 5 its circulation was
limited to five subscribers; 8 6 and the speech was unlikely to be chilled by
punitive damages because it was motivated by profit-seeking.
8 7
While joining with Justice Powell to form the majority result in favor of
Greenmoss Builders, the separate concurrences of Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White substantively have more in common with each other than with
Justice Powell's opinion. The Chief Justice, noting that he had dissented in
than full first amendment status. He supplemented this showing of different treatment of vary-
ing types of speech by noting the acceptability of state licensing of lawyers, psychiatrists and
public school teachers when the same action as to union organizers had been determined viola-
tive of the first amendment. Id. at 2945 n.5.
181. Id. at 2944-46. One example of a purely private matter is the unauthorized letter a
motorcycle dealer sent to his distributor complaining of bad service rendered by a competing
dealer. Harley-Davidson Motorsports v. Markley, 279 Or. at 361, 568 P.2d at 1359. See, e.g.,
COMMUNICATIONS LAW, supra note 112, at 40-43.
182. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2946.
183. Id. at 2947. This characterization of a "matter of public concern" is central to a
determination of the free speech rights of public employees. The interest competing with the
employee's right to speak on such matters is the right of an employer to efficiently manage an
organization. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (firing of teacher who
wrote letter to newspaper criticizing school budget allocations an infringement of protected
first amendment speech). In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Supreme Court up-
held the termination of an assistant district attorney for distributing a questionnaire to elicit
employee views on items such as a grievance committee, office transfers, and pressure to work
in the political campaigns of office-supported candidates. Id. at 155 (Appendix to Opinion of
the Court). By a five-member majority, the Court ruled that the questionnaire, as a whole, did
not address a matter of public concern. Id. at 154. Therefore, no balancing of the competing
free speech and effective management issues was necessary. Id. at 146. Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens joined in a dissent written by Justice Brennan. Id. at 156 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See generally Note, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Free Speech Right of Public
Employees, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 429 (1984).
184. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
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Gertz, declared that Gertz is limited to matters of general public impor-
tance 88 and called for it to be overruled.' 89 Concluding that the instant
case "relates to a matter of essentially private concern," Chief Justice Burger
agreed with Justice Powell that Gertz was inapplicable.' 9 °
After reflecting upon the development of modern defamation law, Justice
White, in his concurrence, concluded that Sullivan struck an "improvident
balance" between the public's interest in its officials and the reputational
interest of the person being defamed.' 9 ' He continued to adhere to the un-
derlying assumption of Sullivan that the free flow of information is crucial in
a self-governing country. Nonetheless, Justice White was convinced that
Sullivan and Gertz were "severe overkill" for accomplishing their legitimate
purpose.' 92 Moreover, false statements about public officials, which Sullivan
protects absent a showing of actual malice, pollute the information stream
with falsehoods and actually undercut the first amendment's goal of trans-
mitting information to citizens.' 93 Justice White reasserted the position he
expressed in his Gertz dissent that the common law approach was preferable
tor private libel plaintiffs. This approach provided what libel plaintiffs usu-
ally want most, restoring their good names.' 94 Further, limits on recover-
able damages would ensure that the media were not dissuaded from
aggressively doing their jobs.' 95 Notwithstanding his own objections to
Gertz, however, Justice White noted that the plurality ostensibly relied on it
but, in fact, reinterpreted it.196 He concluded that Gertz was intended for all
cases of false facts injurious to reputation.
197
In his dissent,' 98 Justice Brennan articulated two principles upon which
the full Court agreed: first, that Sullivan's actual malice requirements ap-
plied to public officials and public figures, and, second, that the Gertz puni-
tive damages formulation should be maintained for matters of public
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger preferred instead to re-
turn to the pre-Gertz era "to allow this area of law to continue to evolve as it [had] up to [then]
with respect to private citizens rather than embark on a new doctrinal theory which [had] no
jurisprudential ancestry." Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 355 (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting)). See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
190. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
191. Id. at 2950 (White, J., concurring). See, e.g., supra note 41 and accompanying text.
192. 105 S. Ct. at 2952 (White, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 2951 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also noted that the incidents of
reputations destroyed when reasonable investigatory efforts could have avoided these "grossly
perverse results." Id. (White, J., concurring).
194. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring). See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
195. 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 2952-53 (White, J., concurring). See infra note 226 and accompanying text.
197. 105 S. Ct. at 2952-53 (White, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 2954 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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concern. 99 He also rejected the distinction between media and nonmedia
defendants urged by respondent Greenmoss Builders. The worth of speech,
he observed, is not dependent on its source. 2° Instead, the traditional focus
of the courts has been to promote the first amendment. He concluded that
the argument that Gertz should be limited to the media "misapprehends" the
relevant case law.2' Further, to make such a distinction would plunge the
courts into the quagmire of deciding who is a member of the institutional
press.2 Justice Brennan refuted the idea that the small number of subscrib-
ers and the specialized nature of the information constituted a clear media/
nonmedia line "consistent with First Amendment principles."2 3
The conviction underlying Justice Brennan's opinion is that libel regula-
tion is analogous to other state measures which deter speech otherwise
protected by the first amendment.2°4 Moreover, the partial constitutional-
ization of defamation law developed because the state measures presented
199. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). In outlining this common ground, Justice Brennan may
he narrowing the opinion's future precedential scope.
200. Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777).
201. Id. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan emphasized: "We protect the
press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees. This solicitude implies no en-
dorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser First Amendment
protection." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). This media/nonmedia dichotomy was addressed
quite profoundly by Justice Potter Stewart in 1975. He stated that the free press clause, wholly
distinct from the clause guaranteeing freedom of speech, extends protection to an institution.
"The publishing business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection .... " Stewart, "Or of the Press, " 26 HASTING L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
"If the Free Press guarantee meant no more than the freedom of expression, it would be a
constitutional redundancy." Id. Justice Stewart further explained that the primary purpose of
the free press guarantee was "to create a fourth institution outside the Government as an
additional check on the three official branches." Id. at 634. See Nimmer, Introduction-Is
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy? What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 656 (1975). This view of the institutional press as imbued with a separate purpose
and requiring distinct treatment underlies Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977) (free
press clause extricates editorial judgment from some discovery procedures in a civil action),
rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). For the Supreme Court discussion on this issue, see supra note 88.
Justice Brennan relies extensively on Bellotti in this section of his dissent. In that case the
Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corporations from at-
tempting to sway the outcome of referendums concerning public issues that affected their as-
sets or business. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765. Justice Powell, who wrote the Bellotti majority
opinion, noted that the institutional press does have a distinct role in the scheme of self-gov-
ernment. However, he concluded that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether
corporation, association, union or individual." Id. at 777.
202. 105 S. Ct. at 2957 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan highlighted this difficulty
by attempting to categorize Dun & Bradstreet. Id. at 2957 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 2957 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 2955 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan specifically noted measures to
control obscenity, as well as others to ensure loyalty, protect consumers or oversee professions
through regulation of speech.
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such a grave potential compromise to the first amendment. Such potential
danger necessitated the use of delicately crafted tools to ensure protection of
free expression. 2 5 He found that the unconstrained availability of presumed
and punitive damages is "too blunt a regulatory instrument" to satisfy the
first amendment's anathema of content-based regulation.20 6 This was true
even when the alleged libel did not directly implicate speech at the core of
the first amendment. 2 7 These perils in turn gave birth to Gertz. Justice
Brennan vehemently attacked what he saw as Justice Powell's dilution of the
scope of the protections Gertz instilled. 20 8 He asserted that the plurality's
detailed explanation of the balancing in Gertz actually side-stepped its pri-
mary dictate that any regulation in this area must be narrowly tailored to its
purpose.20 9 In Justice Brennan's view, Gertz went beyond this to find that
punitive damages were not merely too broad to accomplish their purpose of
redressing harm to reputation but "wholly irrelevant" to it.210 He stated
that the existence in many states of a common law, qualified privilege for
credit reports belied the fact that this type of speech was susceptible to being
chilled.2 1' Justice Brennan asserted that credit reporting did not comport
with the Court's definition of commercial speech, which is accorded less,
though still substantial, first amendment protection.212 Moreover, speech of
an economic nature should never be relegated to lower first amendment
standing even if the majority's public concern determinant were to be insti-
tuted.213 Therefore, even in the event that the credit report were adjudged
205. Id. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
206. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
207. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan earlier also perceived a great threat in
sanctions which were too broad and too available. He thus urged in his Rosenbloom dissent
that the Court restrict punitive damages when only private persons and their private concerns
were involved. See supra note 96.
208. Id. at 2959 n. 11 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("One searches Gertz in vain for a single
word to support the proposition that limits on presumed and punitive damages obtained only
when speech involved matters of public concern.") Accord see supra notes 196-97 and accom-
panying text (discussing Justice White's concurrence).
209. Cf Lowe v. SEC, 105 S. Ct. 2557, 2585-86 (1985) (White, J., concurring in result);
accord Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565-66
(1980).
210. 105 S. Ct. at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350). But see
id. at 2944 n.4 (Powell, J.) (all such statements in Gertz referred only to the public speech
context).
211. Id. at 2963 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Vermont, however, had no such privilege for
credit reporting services. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also generally Maurer,
supra note 18, at 99-105.
212. 105 S. Ct. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 175, for a discussion of the
commercial speech doctrine.
213. 105 S. Ct. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to be private, it was still worthy of first amendment protection. 2 4 Finally,
Justice Brennan criticized Justice White and Justice Powell for proclaiming
a public concern determinant for protection without guidelines for the lower
court judges and jurors who will be called upon to grapple with it.
215
III. THE MEANING OF GREENMOSS AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
A. The Greenmoss Decision: Creating a New Layer in Libel Litigation
The Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders materially
changed the direction of defamation law. First, the decision requires the
trial court to determine the public or private status of the challenged expres-
sion as well as of the litigants. As a result, a subject matter classification, a
mechanism the Court allows only under the narrowest circumstances in or-
der to preserve freedom of expression,216 now determines when a defamation
defendant is susceptible to presumed and punitive damages. Under Green-
moss these damages will be more available, implicating, by powerful analogy,
the fundamental first amendment principle that measures which directly in-
hibit freedom of expression must be precisely defined in order to be sus-
tained.217 Second, the Greenmoss determinant's scant definition impedes the
efficacy of libel litigation. The practical effect of the decision may be illus-
trated by one scenario it actually establishes and by another it suggests.
When a private libel plaintiff, as determined by cases beginning with Sullivan
and ending with Hutchinson, brings an action, the defendant may be liable
for the defamatory falsehood upon a finding of fault.218 Before Greenmoss,
the suit would end with the plaintiff entitled to those damages determined by
the jury as compensation for the injury. If the plaintiff could prove actual
malice, punitive damages would be added to this sum. After Greenmoss,
with the same private libel plaintiff, the jury would make the same liability
214. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905
(1971) ("The language of the First Amendment does not except speech directed at private
economic decisionmaking. Certainly such speech could not be regarded as less important than
political expression." (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of cert.)).
215. 105 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See infra note 241 and accompanying text. Prior to Justice Rehnquist's statement in
Firestone, 424 U.S. at 456, the Court had avoided stressing subject matter criteria. See Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) ("The guarantees for speech and press are not the pre-
serve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy
government."); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 271 ("The constitutional protection does not turn upon
'the truth, popularity or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.' " (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963))).
217. See infra notes 243-44, for a brief discussion of the overbreadth and void-for-vague-
ness doctrines.
218. The actual standard of fault, of course, is left to the individual states in accord with
Gertz. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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determination based on fault. It would then determine whether the chal-
lenged statement was a matter of public concern. If it was public, the result
would be the same as above: the successful plaintiff would receive compen-
satory damages and punitive damages only on the finding of actual malice.
If, however, the challenged statement was a matter of private concern, the
plaintiff could, based only on the defendant's fault, receive punitive
damages.2" 9
In the scenario that Greenmoss suggests, a public official or public figure,
as determined by the Sullivan-Butts decisions, prevails by demonstrating the
defendant's actual malice. Before Greenmoss, the plaintiff would receive
only actual damages and the suit would end following the jury's decision on
an award necessary to compensate the public figure for reputational injury.
After Greenmoss, the jury would also assess the nature of the challenged
statement. If the statement were public, Gertz requires that the actual mal-
ice that leads to liability also produces punitive damages for the plaintiff. If
the statement were private, however, Greenmoss suggests that the court may
award punitive damages without proof of actual malice. Thus the Green-
moss ruling and implications present a puzzle and a thicket. The puzzle is
how trial courts will recognize a matter of Greenmoss "public" as opposed to
"private" concern.22° The thicket is an intellectual one caused by the dis-
comfort of knowing that this determination may trigger a court's vastly dif-
ferent defamation treatment of articles in the very same publication.221
The cornerstone of Greenmoss is, of course, the public concern determi-
nant for allowable damages. But prior to any close examination of it, two
prefatory matters bear attention: Justice Powell's characterization of Gertz
and the source of the public concern test. Justice Powell creates the analytic
maneuvering room to introduce the test by shrinking the scope of Gertz to
public speech alone. He does this while feigning allegiance to the landmark
decision.
Justice Powell was technically correct when he stated that Gertz did not
219. This instance describes the Greenmoss facts.
220. Justice Brennan's Gertz dissent asserted that trial courts could draw guidance from
the accumulated case law to determine the existence of a matter of public concern. 418 U.S. at
369 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text. This has be-
come an even less persuasive proposition in light of Justice Brennan's rejection of the Green-
moss public concern determinant partially for lack of guidelines. See supra note 215 and
accompanying text.
221. One commentator described this new first amendment hierarchy with "editorials and
'political' news items at its apex, 'economic' and business news somewhere further down,
Parade magazine next, followed finally by advertisements and classified." Wiley & Frank,
Complications for Libel Defense Increased by Greenmoss Ruling, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1985, at
33, col. 4. "This analysis would seem to leave unclear only the proper legal standard to be
applied to the comics." Id.
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decide how a future court would balance the state's interest in compensating
private individuals against the first amendment interest "regardless of the
type of speech involved." '2 22 Concededly, the Court did not proclaim any
comprehensive result for all types of expression because that was not the
issue before it; the case centered on categories of persons rather than on
categories of speech. Indeed, the only category of speech Gertz explored was
defamatory falsehoods. The issue was how to treat varying types of persons
aggrieved by this speech. Undeniably, Gertz arose in a public context, just as
Justice Powell asserted. The challenged statements were published in a mag-
azine disseminated throughout the nation.2 23 However, because categories
of speech were not squarely before the Court, Gertz belies no intent to be
restricted to public speech alone. This is made clear by the plurality, which
refers to the "context" of Gertz rather than relying upon restrictive language
in the decision itself.22 4 That the limitation to public speech is inherent in
the context is unpersuasive. This flaw is not only underscored by the dis-
sent 225 but by Justice White's concurrence as well. Although Justice White
did not assent to its tenets, he correctly recognized that the Gertz holding
extended to all false reports.2 26 The Greenmoss plurality, therefore, gives no
convincing reason for its compression of Gertz. Yet this reinterpretation of
Gertz is the gateway to its Greenmoss decision.2 27
The public concern test is further weakened by its development in an un-
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
224. 105 S. Ct. at 2944 n.4. See generally supra note 179 and accompanying text.
225. 105 S. Ct. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 208 and accompanying
text.
226. 105 S. Ct. at 2952-53 (White, J., concurring). See supra notes 196-97 and accompany-
ing text. The concurrence of Justice White, which called for Gertz to be overruled, is preferred
if for no other reason than that it correctly perceived the importance of that seminal ruling.
227. In a footnote, Justice Powell charges that the dissent's view of Gertz would, in effect,
constitutionalize all of common law libel. 105 S. Ct. at 2946 n.7. By way of example he
asserted that a woman whose character was compromised by the comments of a jealous neigh-
bor would have "no effective recourse" without proving actual malice by clear and convincing
evidence. This misapprehends the nature of the Greenmoss case. Greenmoss concerns dam-
ages, not liability. In the above example, the dissent's view poses no threat to liability. Under
Gertz, this woman no doubt would be adjudged a private figure. Therefore, the neighbor's
liability would be determined not by a specified Supreme Court dictate, but by the state's own
standard of fault that could range from negligence to actual malice; she would be accorded all
actual damages. Moreover, as noted earlier, the actual damages included in this calculus can
include recovery for mental anguish and humiliation. See supra notes 57-59 and accompany-
ing text. In this regard, Justice White's observation that most libel plaintiffs, whether public
figures or private individuals, are more interested in restoring their good names than in recov-
ering monetary damages is particularly instructive. 105 S. Ct. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
See supra note 135 and accompanying text. This assertion is supported in at least one instance.
Ariel Sharon is quoted as having said that the $50 million damages he was seeking in his suit
against Time, Inc. was not important to him; he sought that sum simply "to have the case be
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related area of law, the public employee context of Connick v. Myers.22 8
This reliance is questionable as it misapprehends the full nature of the inter-
ests involved in these cases. When dealing with government employees, the
state interest is "the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline, '229 a
factor essential for the government "to perform its responsibilities effectively
and economically. '"23 This consideration is weighed against the freedom of
speech of the individual employee. In defamation cases, however, both par-
ties to a suit possess these personal, rather than governmental or monetary,
interests. While litigated as the state's right to redress reputational harm to
its citizens, one must remember that the true plaintiff in any defamation
action is usually the individual citizen. That person has a strong interest in a
good name, 231 or, at least, in a name not sullied falsely, with reckless disre-
gard of the truth of the damning remark. The opponent brings to the defa-
mation litigation the freedom of expression, another "individualized,"
nongovernmental interest.232 Thus, the concerns in government employ-
ment and in defamation cases diverge widely. As a result, the public con-
cern determinant most fully developed in the government employee setting
does not effectively transfer into the defamation sphere. 233 This foreign ori-
gin of the public concern determinant seriously undercuts the Greenmoss
plurality's heavy reliance upon it.
234
taken seriously." Denton, Time Item on Sharon Found False, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1985, at
A8, col. 6.
228. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
229. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
230. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part).
231. See generally supra notes 1, 6.
232. Of course this freedom is not absolute and carries with it responsibilities. See, e.g.,
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 642 (1951) ("freedom of speech or press does not mean
that one can talk or distribute where, when and how one chooses. Rights other than those of
the advocates are involved."). See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 771 (false advertising claims not protected); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957) (obscene speech not protected); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (first amendment would not protect the false shouts of fire in a
theater).
233. Justice Brennan fully recognized this fact when he noted that Connick limited its dis-
tinction between public and private concern to the government employment context. 105 S.
Ct. at 2962 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 & n.8).
234. The Greenmoss test is not wholly without merit. Designed to function in conjunction
with the Sullivan-Butts-Gertz public figure test for liability, this coupling of tests is an honest
and positive recognition of the interplay between the person and the event and of the true
inquiry that courts had heretofore labeled solely its plaintiff-based analysis. Justice Powell
recognized the existence of this person-and-event connection in Gertz when he observed that
an individual could be a public figure for some specified public controversy. The Firestone
analysis underscores this interdependence although Justice Rehnquist did not so identify it.
One of the rationales for finding Firestone a private person for defamation purposes was that
divorces of the rich were not the "sort of'public controversy' referred to in Gertz." 424 U.S. at
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Having explored the issues tangential to the public concern determinant,
an examination of the test itself and its jurisprudential setting is appropriate.
Generically, the Greenmoss test is a subject matter classification. In this
way, as Justice Brennan points out, it is analogous to other state measures
which impinge on the freedom of expression.235 Its operation and effect
"must be subjected to close analysis and critical judgment in the light of the
particular circumstances to which it is applied." '236 As a result, the test
should comport at least minimally with fundamental principles of constitu-
tional law. In addition, Greenmoss' public concern test resembles the "pub-
lic event" determination briefly instilled by the Court in Rosenbloom.237
Indeed, these two tests are similar enough that the reasons for the recanta-
tion of Rosenbloom reveal the defects of the new Greenmoss framework as
well.
A measure which may deter exercise of the freedom of expression, such as
a subject matter classification, is dangerous. The peril is not in its mere
existence, however, but in its potential. It has within it the power to violate
the first amendment.2 38 The Gertz Court acknowledged the danger of poten-
tial first amendment compromises when Justice Powell, later the author of
Greenmoss, expressed the Court's doubt of the wisdom of committing the
task of determining what is of general or public interest to the conscience of
judges. In conferring this power upon the courts, Justice Powell feared that
neither of the competing interests would be adequately served.239 This led to
the demise of Rosenbloom.240 In Firestone, Justice Rehnquist underscored
that subject matter classifications often improperly balance these competing
interests. "It was our recognition and rejection of this weakness in the Ro-
senbloom test which led us in Gertz to eschew a subject-matter test for one
focusing upon the character of the defamation plaintiff."24' In practice, the
454. See supra notes 144-48, 162, and accompanying text; see also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 112, at 951-52.
235. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2955-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 204 and
accompanying text.
236. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958), quoted in Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2956
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
237. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 216. As the Greenmoss plurality correctly points out, the existence of
such a classification is not reprehensible in itself because freedom of expression is no absolute
right; see, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 112, at 865-67.
239. 418 U.S. at 346.
240. See Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also supra note 96.
Justice Marshall added that this approach also threatens the private plaintiff's ability to suc-
ceed using a lower standard because "all human events are arguably within the area of 'public
or general concern.' " 403 U.S. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. 424 U.S. at 456.
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new public concern test would require precisely these same decisions on the
part of trial judges and juries. It appears that even Justice Brennan, who
crafted the Rosenbloom general interest standard, has acknowledged the dif-
ficulty. His Greenmoss dissent repudiates the test as exceeding the bounds of
acceptable subject matter criteria.242
What is an acceptable subject matter classification in light of this latent
danger is tied to how precisely it accomplishes its legitimate purpose. When
even one iota broader than it must be to accomplish its task, this classifica-
tion intolerably violates the Constitution and is disallowed.2 43 One cannot
measure how narrowly a scheme is tailored to its purpose when little clarity
exists as to the scheme itself. Here, uncertainty as to the elements of the test
constitutes an additional obstacle to its adherence to fundamental constitu-
tional principles.24 4 Indeed, this is a puzzle.
242. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. General, though fundamental, constitu-
tional law principles, which recognize the importance of freedom of speech, dictate that "even
when the state does have the power to regulate an area, it 'must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.'" Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940), quoted in J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
112, at 868. Moreover, such measures must be designed with "narrow specificity." NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. at 433 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311). A measure is overbroad when it
brings within its prohibitions protected as well as unprotected speech. Justice Brennan was
correct when he stated that the requirement of narrowly tailored regulatory measures simply
prohibits presumed and punitive damages on less than an actual malice showing. 105 S. Ct. at
2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. The Rosenbloom and Greenmoss tests also share a lack of specificity. It is quite telling
that Justice Marshall's disapproval of Justice Brennan's Rosenbloom public event test for lia-
bility, lack of guidelines for lower courts, is precisely the criticism that Justice Brennan, writ-
ing the Greenmoss dissent, had for the Greenmoss plurality's public concern test. Justice
Marshall found in Rosenbloom: "My Brother Brennan does not try to provide guidelines or
standards by which courts are to decide the scope of public concern." 403 U.S. at 79 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). In Greenmoss, Justice Brennan attempted without success to cull the key
factors for this public concern determination from the plurality's virtually nonexistent discus-
sion. 105 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
First amendment freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in
our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of the sanctions." Button, 371 U.S. at 433, quoted in J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &
J. YOUNG, supra note 112, at 872. Therefore, vagueness in a measure may be fatal: it gives
insufficient guidance as to what expression comes within its prohibitions. The two doctrines of
overbreadth and vagueness are distinct but closely related. Were the Greenmoss public con-
cern determinant to be tested against these principles, it would fail on both. As to vagueness, it
gives no guidance to courts or to individuals subject to it as to what expression could expose
them to the hefty monetary punishment of punitive damages. As to overbreadth, Justice Bren-
nan was correct when he concluded that the increased availability of punitive damages and the
attendant jury discretion that this framework creates, is "too blunt" an instrument to be toler-
ated in light of the first amendment interest. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2956 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). This is the reason such an instrument negatively impacts even "private" speech.
See supra notes 48, 207, 214, and accompanying text.
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The public concern test is variously characterized as determining "matters
of public concern";245 matters of "general public importance"; 246 and a
"matter of public importance. '2 4' The only insight into what this means is,
in reality, a veiled and inept distinction between media and nonmedia enti-
ties. The Court concluded that the credit report was merely a private matter
relying partly on the fact that only five persons received the information.248
The Court thus tumbled into a circulation-based definition of "media":
large enough numbers somehow make one valid "media." This suggests that
only items transmitted by "valid" media are of public concern.
Justice Powell's second definitional guide also builds on this media notion
and is equally unhelpful. That the credit report was only of interest to its
specific business subscribers249 simply cannot be the basis for determining
whether an expression is of public concern. This analysis ignores the sub-
scriber-supported communications technologies in an era of narrow casting
in which programming is designed for small audiences who are willing to
pay for it. In this way, such programming is offered to a customer in a
relationship similar to the one Dun & Bradstreet has with its own subscrib-
ers. Because few avail themselves of the opportunity to subscribe to the pro-
gramming does not automatically mean that the programming is not of
interest, or importance, to others. 25 ° Thus, it is conceivable that, under Jus-
tice Powell's view, programming for which viewers subscribe through en-
hanced cable services may not be deemed of public concern because it is
supported only by a relatively small, interested subscriber base. Using Jus-
tice Powell's media terminology, the exclusive subscriber relationship of the
customer and operator makes the provider a nonmedia entity. In fact, it is
beyond dispute that cable is a form of media.251
In sum, the plurality has recreated its own recent history, albeit in modi-
fied form. It has promulgated an unusable and untenable subject matter
classification. In so doing, it returns defamation litigation to the dangerous
path that Gertz already once corrected. Greenmoss now requires the Court
to right itself once again.
245. 105 S. Ct. at 2945 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)).
246. Id. at 2948 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
247. Id. at 2953 (White, J., concurring).
248. Id. at 2947. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
249. 105 S. Ct. at 2947.
250. This was precisely Justice Marshall's message in his Rosenbloom dissent when he
stated his fears in leaving the decisions of what is important to self-government to the con-
science of judges and juries. See supra note 96. In addition, information relating to a com-
pany's financial health may be of great importance not only to creditors but to employees or a
local economy as well.
251. See, e.g., Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2957-58 nn.6-7 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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B. Greenmoss Reconsidered: A Modest Proposal for
Effective Defamation Litigation
Defamation is a particularly complex area of law, a fact highlighted re-
cently by the fragmented Greenmoss opinion. Trial courts are already called
upon to decide the public or private status of a defamation plaintiff without
significant guidance from the Supreme Court. In Greenmoss, the Court has
created another layer of inquiry with equally little direction. The reduction
of first amendment protection for the exercise of unfettered expression that
Greenmoss produces need not have happened. Instead, the Greenmoss Court
could have left Gertz intact and still protected the reputation interests of
private libel plaintiffs. Gertz struck an appropriate balance between the com-
peting interests of compensating defamed individuals and of preserving the
exercise of free expression to the extent that it instilled some fault standard
for liability and narrowed the possibility for punitive damages.2z 2 Thus, it is
worthy of judicial allegiance rather than the reinterpretation the Greenmoss
plurality gave it. To increase the incidence of punishment when a private
individual is the libel plaintiff is to assert, in essence, that expression is some-
how less precious a freedom when exercised in private, that is, when expres-
sion is whispered rather than roared. This cannot be.2 53 However, the
wholly legitimate goals of defamed individuals to be vindicated and compen-
sated can be much better served within the Gertz framework than is pres-
ently the common experience.
Justice White alluded to one aspect of the proper course to improve libel
litigation when he referred to separate verdicts as a means of restoring a
252. This discussion is framed in the context of not eroding Gertz, which acknowledged the
inappropriateness of punitive damages absent the actual malice finding "where the underlying
aim of the law is to compensate for harm actually caused." Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 73
(Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2956 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See
supra note 96. This, of course, was the impetus for Justice Powell's conclusion in Gertz that
punitive damages are "wholly irrelevant" to the state's legitimate compensatory purpose.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. See, e.g., supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. However, the
author is convinced that the most prudent constitutional course is to abolish the possibility of
punitive damages in the context of libel litigation altogether. In this, the author finds Justice
Marshall's Rosenbloom dissent highly persuasive. See supra note 96; see also Spokane Truck &
Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash. 45, 25 P. 1072 (1891) ("punitive damages cannot be allowed on
the theory that it is for the benefit of society at large [which is protected by the criminal law],
but must logically be allowed on the theory that they are for the sole benefit of the plaintiff,
who has already been fully compensated; a theory which is repugnant to every sense of jus-
tice"), quoted in R. SACK, supra note 55, at 351 n.47.
253. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 595 (1957) ("But the size of the audience has
heretofore been deemed wholly irrelevant to First Amendment issues. One has a right to free-
dom of speech whether he talks to one person or to one thousand."). See generally M. NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3.02 (1984).
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defamed plaintiff's scarred reputation.254 Such separate verdicts, as opposed
to one general verdict, are not new to tort litigation. They require the jurors
to answer the specific, interim questions which lead to their overall verdict.
In the context of defamation litigation concerning a private individual, the
trier of fact must make six determinations: first, the challenged statement
was defamatory; second, the statement was false; third, the defendant acted
negligently (or consistent with that state's standard for liability, if it is not
negligence); fourth, what damage award would compensate the plaintiff for
the actual harm of the false, defamatory, negligently inflicted statement;
255
fifth, the defendant acted with actual malice; and sixth, what amount in pu-
nitive damages would deter the defendant's conduct in the future.256 These
separate determinations expose defamatory falsehoods, thus paving the way
for the plaintiff to regain the confidence of and friendly intercourse with
right-thinking persons.257 Moreover, should the ultimate outcome of the
case be appealed, a reviewing court would have a fuller, more specific record
on which to make the independent examination that Sullivan instituted.25 8
The purely vindicatory function of the separate verdicts, as distinguished
from the compensatory function, is greatly enhanced when such verdicts are
coupled with a judicial pronouncement as to the true nature of the chal-
lenged statement. This declaration would follow affirmative answers to the
first and second questions posed to the jury. That is, the jury would have
found the challenged statement to be both defamatory and false. Declara-
254. Greenmoss, 105 S. Ct. at 2950 n.2 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's discussion
in Gertz is also helpful in underscoring the importance of the vindicatory function of defama-
tion common law. See supra notes 135, 227, and accompanying text.
United States District Court Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, presiding over the Sharon case,
uniquely used such separate verdicts by requiring the jurors to announce their conclusion on
each issue as their deliberations proceeded. See supra note 41. The questions there, of course,
were tailored to public figure defamation litigation. While Judge Sofaer's goal was for the trial
to produce a just result, the separate announcements were particularly appropriate in the con-
text of the "media circus" attending that internationally watched case. The announcements
provided separate media events for each stage of decisionmaking. As it turned out, this en-
hanced Sharon's ability to vindicate his reputation in connection with the massacre of hun-
dreds of Palestinian refugees in Beirut. See Kaplan, The Judge's Postmortem of the Sharon
Libel Trial, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 1. This media byproduct of the separate
announcements is, of course, unlikely in a private defamation case, leaving the primary merit
of a just result with as little confusion as possible in jury instructions.
255. The trial judge, of course, would closely examine this amount to ensure that these
damages are truly compensatory and not merely disguising presumed damages.
256. Purposefully absent from these inquiries are the questions whether the defendant is a
member of the media and whether the challenged statement is a matter of public concern.
257. See supra note 3 for a definition of defamation.
258. See supra notes 80, 142, and accompanying text. The Court's inability to determine
exactly what went into the jury's general verdict in that case was the reason it was remanded.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 284.
[Vol. 35:883
Lowered First Amendment Protection
tory relief alone is said to have little appeal to the plaintiff confident of prov-
ing fault and thus able to receive compensatory damages.2 9 However, when
a declaratory pronouncement is not an alternative to litigation but a part of
it' 6° injected after the second jury verdict, it actually achieves the same goal
as the vindicatory function of libel per se liability. It has a significant advan-
tage, however, as it meets this goal without the violation to free expression
that true liability brings. In this way, the court is functioning as a substitute
for the private individual's lack of access to the media to rebut defamatory
falsehoods.26' The true liability finding, under Gertz, would only come fol-
lowing the jury's affirmative verdict as to the third question, that of fault.
Moreover, by providing some relief for the plaintiff while maintaining the
free exercise of expression interests of the defendant, the approach focuses in
more closely on achieving its legitimate purposes. Thus, it more closely
comports with fundamental constitutional law principles; it is one of the es-
sential, "finer" instruments for handling these issues to which the Greenmoss
dissent referred.262
Finally, for extremely rare instances, individual states would be free to
take extraordinary measures263 to ensure that the private libel plaintiff is
fully compensated for harm. As an example, the plaintiff could be allowed
to petition the court during a specified time, such as between twelve and
fifteen months from the initial judgment, for consideration of additional
compensatory damages. This new action would be limited solely to this
damages issue. If the plaintiff could demonstrate by clear and convincing
proof that he or she suffered continued injury as the direct outgrowth of the
earlier defamatory falsehood, the court could assess additional, reasonable
compensatory damages. However, to discourage frivolous or nuisance suits,
the court would also be free to deny any additional sums and to order that
259. See R. SACK, supra note 55, at 364; see also D. DOBBS, supra note 56, at 526 ("As
appealing as this kind of remedy [the declaratory judgment] is for certain limited kinds of
defamation, it is so clearly inadequate for the destruction of a man's career, that it holds little
chance of wide use."). The notion of declaratory judgments cases involving the freedom of
expression is not foreign to the members of the Court. Justice Brennan suggested such a rem-
edy coupled with an order to correct in print the falsehood. See Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring), noted in Lewis, supra note 7, at
616 nn.7-8.
260. In confining this discussion to the context of defamation litigation, the author in no
way intends to diminish the importance of summary judgments in this field. Such a disposal of
the case at as early a stage as possible is overwhelmingly the preferred result. Similarly, this
approach is not intended to substitute for or in any way weaken the strong appellate review
established in Sullivan. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 204-07, 243-44 and accompanying text.
263. This is consistent with the latitude Gertz established for states to continue developing
their own defamation jurisprudence. See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff pay all of defendant's court costs and attorney's fees associated
with the second action. While such a call for more litigation might appear to
further burden already crammed and backlogged dockets, it is really a trade-
off in a post-Greenmoss world. With Greenmoss, the trial court is obligated
to negotiate the tortures of the public concern determinant during the initial
case, eating up precious court resources. Here, however, with the built-in
deterrent of court costs and attorney's fees, the additional litigation would be
utilized only rarely.
In sum, when separate verdicts are used in conjunction with both a declar-
atory pronouncement and the latitude established in Gertz for states to en-
sure that private libel plaintiffs are adequately compensated, society reaps
twin benefits: helping restore the plaintiff's reputation while not compro-
mising the defendant's freedom of expression.2
Had the proposed approach been followed in Greenmoss, at the conclusion
of the presentation of evidence including proof of injury, the trial judge
would divide the jury's charge and deliberations into separate components.
First, the jury would have made a finding on whether the challenged state-
ment was defamatory, relying for guidance on the state's decisional law.265
Secondly, the jury would have decided whether the credit report issued by
Dun & Bradstreet was false. According to trial testimony, the answer here
would be yes. Going no further in the proceeding, the trial court would have
then issued a statement delineating the falsity and defamation of Dun &
Bradstreet's initial report and clarifying the subsequent "blank rating.
'2 66
This would have given a public, judicial pronouncement of the statement's
264. Other reforms have also been proposed. One of the most prominent is that of Marc A.
Franklin, Richman Professor of Law at Stanford University. Central to his plan is that abso-
lutely no punitive damages would ever be allowed in libel cases. Secondly, he would eliminate
the distinction between public and private figures. For those not interested in a money award,
he would have states offer the option of a "no-fault" proceeding. Here a potential plaintiff
would first seek a retraction by the defamation defendant. If that is denied, a judge would
preside at a hearing to determine the truth or falsity of a published statement. Upon a finding
of falsity, the judge would order a retraction by the media defendant. If a plaintiff cared to
pursue money damages, however, he or she could do so with the loser required to pay the
winner's attorney's fees. In this way frivolous suits for money damages would be discouraged.
Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and A Proposal, 18 U.S.F.L.
REV. 1, 35-49 (1983). This proposal has sparked some concern that it will leave judges and
juries to decide the official truth in a case. This is said to be a danger in a free society and
would also create "a hornet's nest of petty litigation." Hager & Rosenstiel, Libel Battle: From
Courts to Lawbooks, Los Angeles Times, Feb. 20, 1985, pt. 1, at 12, col. 6.
265. The jury decides the defamatory nature of the particular statement following the
judge's determination whether the statement may be so as a matter of law. H. OLECK,
OLECK's TORT LAW PRACTICE MANUAL § 217 (1982).
266. See Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. 66, 72, 461 A.2d 414, 416
(1983).
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falsity and that Greenmoss Builders had thereby been wronged.2 67 This dec-
laration would have implied that harm was a direct outflow of a false, defam-
atory statement. This declaration would be the sole remedy at this juncture
rather than monetary damages. Thus, it would have vindicated the de-
famed, private individual while not potentially chilling expression.
Following the false and defamatory findings, however, the trier of fact's
duties would not have ended. The jury would have then decided whether
the defendant was at fault in communicating the defamatory falsehood.
Again, in the instant case, because Dun & Bradstreet's routine procedure for
verifying all information prior to publishing its reports had not been fol-
lowed, it would likely have been found to be at fault. This would have trig-
gered the jury's further decision as to whether Greenmoss would be entitled
to compensatory damages, both general and special. Such an amount would
have been, according to the court's instruction to the jury, reasonably related
to the measure of injury which the plaintiff had presented to the jurors. As
is currently the case, the trial judge could modify any jury award he or she
deemed excessive to compensate for demonstrated injury. The last jury in-
quiry would have been whether, as demonstrated by clear and convincing
proof, the defendant had acted with actual malice. If so, the private libel
plaintiff would also be entitled to punitive damages, in accord with Gertz. If
not, the initial suit would have drawn to an end. However, had the injury
continued, Greenmoss could seek to prove with convincing clarity that the
injury continued at a subsequent suit instituted during the period specified
by the state.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, the Supreme Court
forced libel litigants into a more complex, treacherous defamation frame-
work. The Court reconstrued its landmark Gertz decision and made pre-
sumed and punitive damage awards contingent on an inappropriately
borrowed "public concern" determinant. The Greenmoss plurality narrowed
free expression protection using a subject matter classification too broad and
too vague to comport with established first amendment principles. Two of
the gravest aspects of Greenmoss are the unsettling analysis with which the
plurality arrived at its result and the lack of guidance it provided for lower
courts. Libel litigation produces hardships for both plaintiffs and defend-
267. This step could be particularly effective in the Greenmoss case if the court declaration
was sent to all those who received the original, false report. Dun & Bradstreet's confidential
relationships with its subscribers could be guarded by revealing the names to the court only
and making that information a sealed part of the judicial record.
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ants; its present configuration dilutes the law's ability to effectively protect
either party's interests. Greenmoss has made a bad situation worse. Indeed
Greenmoss' ultimate significance may lie in the litigation it is sure to spawn,
requiring the Court to reconsider 268 and, one hopes, to rectify the direction
of its defamation law jurisprudence.
Patricia A. Thompson-Hill
268. In so doing, the Court would be in accord with Justice Harlan, who changed his view
from the time the Court decided Butts to the time it considered Rosenbloom: "Where matters
are in flux. . . it is more important to re-think past conclusions than to adhere to them with-
out question [as] the problem under consideration remains in a state of evolution. ... 403
U.S. at 72 n.3 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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